An entrepreneur, with private information about his firm, contracts over two periods with an outside financier, a venture capitalist (VC) or angel. The financier can reduce his information disadvantage by learning about the firm over time. VC financing is scarce relative to angel financing. Further, unlike an angel, a VC may exert effort, which, together with the entrepreneur’s effort, increases the firm’s success probability. The equilibrium VC financing contract ensures optimal effort-exertion by both entrepreneur and VC. We characterize the firm’s equilibrium choice between VC and angel financing, its equilibrium contractual provisions, and the dynamic evolution of its financing contract.

This paper documents a new channel for rating-based bond market segmentation, which, in contrast to prior research, is based on nonregulatory investment management practices. A 2005 Lehman Brothers index redefinition provides a quasinatural experiment in which a number of previously high-yield split-rated bonds were mechanically relabeled as investment grade. Although their regulatory standing was unaffected, these bonds had abnormal yield declines of 21 basis points. These valuation changes can be traced to buying by asset-class-sensitive institutional investors for whom these bonds became investable. Reputation, regulation, indexation, and liquidity cannot explain the observed price and trading patterns.

This paper examines banks’ diversification–performance nexus from the perspective of demand, the magnitude of households’ financial participation, with bank data from 22 European countries over the period from 2002 to 2009. We argue that the magnitude of households’ financial participation develops asymmetric diversification effects on banks’ performance. The empirical investigation herein provides evidence for the asymmetric influence of households’ financial participation on the effect of banks’ income diversification on their performance. Our findings suggest that banks should take into account the deposit interest rates and the variety of households’ investment habits when they operate toward diversification.

This paper examines the profits of revenue, earnings, and price momentum strategies in an attempt to understand investor reactions when facing multiple information of firm performance in various scenarios. We first offer evidence that there is no dominating momentum strategy among the revenue, earnings, and price momentums, suggesting that revenue surprises, earnings surprises, and prior returns each carry some exclusive unpriced information content. We next show that the profits of momentum driven by firm fundamental performance information (revenue or earnings) depend upon the accompanying firm market performance information (price), and vice versa. The robust monotonicity in multivariate momentum returns is consistent with the argument that the market does not only underestimate the individual information but also the joint implications of multiple information on firm performance, particularly when they point in the same direction. A three-way combined momentum strategy may offer monthly return as high as 1.44%. The information conveyed by revenue surprises and earnings surprises combined account for about 19% of price momentum effects, which finding adds to the large literature on tracing the sources of price momentum.

We develop a model in which individual and institutional reputation concerns conflict with one another to study why investment bank reputation concerns may have diminished in recent years. Unproven but talented bankers have incentive to signal their ability through actions that may or may not best serve their clients. In the spirit of Kreps (1990), we treat the bank as a hierarchical firm whose only asset is its institutional reputation for curbing behavior that is suboptimal for the client. The conflict between individual and institutional reputation concerns is more likely to resolve in favor of institutional reputation when firms recruit only the most talented people, and less so when unique ability is especially valuable. We discuss how technological change has contributed to a “star” culture that is unfavorable toward preservation of institutional reputation.

Social media has become a popular venue for individuals to share the results of their own analysis on financial securities. This paper investigates the extent to which investor opinions transmitted through social media predict future stock returns and earnings surprises. We conduct textual analysis of articles published on one of the most popular social media platforms for investors in the United States. We also consider the readers' perspective as inferred via commentaries written in response to these articles. We find that the views expressed in both articles and commentaries predict future stock returns and earnings surprises.

Many structural economics models are semiparametric ones in which the unknown nuisance functions are identified via non-parametric conditional moment restrictions with possibly non-nested or overlapping conditioning sets, and the finite dimensional parameters of interest are over-identified via unconditional moment restrictions involving the nuisance functions. In this article we characterize the semiparametric efficiency bound for this class of models. We show that semiparametric two-step optimally weighted GMM estimators achieve the efficiency bound, where the nuisance functions could be estimated via any consistent non-parametric methods in the first step. Regardless of whether the efficiency bound has a closed form expression or not, we provide easy-to-compute sieve-based optimal weight matrices that lead to asymptotically efficient two-step GMM estimators.

This paper decomposes the cash component of earnings and analyzes persistence characteristics and pricing implications of various subcomponents, with particular attention to changes in cash. Changes in underlying fundamentals might dictate changes in cash to new optimal levels. Alternatively, suboptimal changes in cash might result from agency costs allowing managers’ actions to diverge from the best interests of shareholders. We predict and find that both suboptimal increases and decreases in cash bode poorly for future earnings. In fact, we find that suboptimal increases (decreases) in cash have less (greater) persistence than any of the earnings components we study, including accruals and net distributions to both shareholders and debt holders. Market efficiency tests indicate that the market severely punishes firms with suboptimal decreases in cash, but we find no evidence to support the hubris hypothesis that the market overreacts to the earnings implications of unwarranted increases in cash.

For a large sample of U.S. firms from 1994 to 2009, we empirically examine the impact of corporate hedging on the cost of public debt. We find strong evidence that hedging is associated with a lower cost of debt. The negative effect of hedging on the cost of debt is consistent across industries, and remains economically and statistically significant under various controls and econometric specifications. A cross-sectional analysis based on propensity score matching suggests that hedging initiation firms experience a drop in cost of debt, while suspension firms sustain a jump. We confirm our findings after employing an extensive array of models to address potential endogeneity. The influence of hedging on cost of debt is mainly through the lowering of bankruptcy risk and agency cost, and the reduction in information asymmetry. Finally, hedging mitigates the negative effect of rising borrowing costs on capital expenditure and firm value.