Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public? By integrating the gravity model of investment with the state-specific process of bank deregulation that occurred in the United States from the 1980s through the 1990s, we develop a bank-specific, time-varying measure of deregulation-induced competition. We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results suggest that competition reduces bank opacity, potentially enhancing the ability of markets to monitor banks.

Abstract Does the structure of financial systems influence the employment respo0nse to adverse shocks? Using (a) county-industry employment data differentiated by firm size and (b) high-frequency county employment data differentiated by income, we find that employment at small firms, employment of low-income workers, and overall employment fell less in counties with higher proportions of small banks in response to the pandemic. Furthermore, small banks lend more to small businesses than large banks, above and beyond government-guaranteed PPP loans. Evidence suggests that small banks cushioned small firms and low-income workers from the adverse effects of the pandemic. (JEL G21, E24, E32, J21, H12)

Abstract We study how involving employee board representatives in determining managerial compensation affects the within-firm pay ratio. The 2009 German Compensation Act shifted executive pay decisions to the entire supervisory board, amplifying employees’ influence at firms with parity employee representation. This reform resulted in increased manager-to-worker pay ratios, driven by higher managerial compensation, without corresponding changes in firm performance or manager turnover. The result is robust in matched samples and absent in falsification tests. Improved employee job security and weak wage increases point to a possible alliance between employees and managers, indicating shared governance may not necessarily reduce pay inequality.

Abstract We evaluate how a positive, technology-driven shock to bank liquidity affects small business dynamics across different size distributions. We first show that banks receiving positive liquidity shocks increase lending to relatively larger SMEs, not to the smallest firms. This finding is consistent with the view that a positive liquidity shock enhances bank charter values, thereby reducing risk-taking incentives. Moreover, such disproportionate credit allocation leads to a crowding-out effect on micro firms. When larger SMEs grow faster and exit less because of better access to credit, their expansion stifles the development of micro firms, whose access to credit remains unchanged. (JEL G21, J21, L22)

We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside leverage are more likely to engage in vertical mergers, and those mergers generate lower announcement returns for shareholders. This effect of CEO relative inside leverage on returns for shareholders in vertical acquisitions is more pronounced when the acquirer has a higher degree of informational opacity, weak governance, and excess cash.

This paper investigates the relationship between industrial diversification and firm valuation in a sample of 816 publicly listed firms in China. It contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it is one of the first studies of diversification and firm value in an emerging market dominated by partially privatized firms. Second, it explores the determinants of corporate diversification by considering some unique aspects of the agency and political conflicts inherent in China's transition toward a market economy. Third, it employs a number of empirical methodologies (instrumental variables estimation, the Heckman self-selection model, and propensity score matching) to examine the relationship between diversification and firm value. The paper finds that when the decision to diversify is modeled as an endogenous choice based on firm characteristics, multi-segment firms have significantly higher Tobin's q than single-segment firms, even after controlling for factors such as ownership structure, ownership concentration, and growth opportunities. In addition, government-controlled multi-segment firms have lower Tobin's q than non-government-controlled multi-segment firms, providing evidence in support of the political cost hypothesis of diversification. Moreover, non-government-controlled firms in growth industries that perform better are more likely to diversify. Overall, our results illustrate that the valuation effect of diversification depends on government control.

We investigate the effect of information asymmetry on corporate tax avoidance. Using a difference-in-differences matching estimator to assess the effects of changes in analyst coverage caused by broker closures and mergers, we find that firms avoid tax more aggressively after a reduction in analyst coverage. We further find that this effect is mainly driven by firms with higher existing tax-planning capacity (e.g., tax-haven presence), smaller initial analyst coverage, and a smaller number of peer firms. Moreover, the effect is more pronounced in industries where reputation matters more and in firms subject to less monitoring from tax authorities.

Abstract Using a unique proprietary account-level trading dataset in China, we investigate how active information acquisition alleviates price-based return comovement, a typical anomaly in stock splits. We find that: 1) individual trading drives the comovement and the trading correlation between split stocks and the low-price portfolio increases significantly after splits; 2) individuals can learn the firm fundamentals through information acquisition, which effectively alleviates their categorized bias; and 3) the role of information acquisition is more significant in environments characterized by greater uncertainty. Our results are robust to different specifications and alternative measures. Taken together, this paper emphasizes the important role of information acquisition in alleviating behavioral bias and improving decision-making.