We show in an environment of incomplete information that monotonicity and the Pareto property applied only when there is common knowledge of Pareto dominance imply (i) there must exist a common prior over the smallest common knowledge event, and (ii) aggregation must be ex ante and ex post utilitarian with respect to that common prior and individual von Neumann–Morgenstern utility indices.

We propose a theory of intertemporal choice that is robust to specific assumptions on the discount rate. One class of models requires that one utility stream be chosen over another if and only if its discounted value is higher for all discount factors in a set. Another model focuses on an average discount factor. Yet another model is pessimistic, and evaluates a flow by the lowest available discounted value.

At an initial time, an individual forms a belief about a future random outcome. As time passes, the individual may obtain, privately or subjectively, further information, until the outcome is eventually revealed. How can a protocol be devised that induces the individual, as a strict best response, to reveal at the outset his prior assessment of both the final outcome and the information flows he anticipates and, subsequently, what information he privately receives? The protocol can provide the individual with payoffs that depend only on the outcome realization and his reports. We develop a framework to design such protocols, and apply it to construct simple elicitation mechanisms for common dynamic environments. The framework is general: we show that strategyproof protocols exist for any number of periods and large outcome sets. For these more general settings, we build a family of strategyproof protocols based on a hierarchy of choice menus, and show that any strategyproof protocol can be approximated by a protocol of this family.

We define the empirical content of an economic theory as the least restrictive observationally equivalent theory. We show that the empirical content of a theory is captured by a certain kind of axiomatization, with axioms that are universal negations of conjunctions of atomic formulae. (JEL B41, D01, D11)

We introduce a new model of stochastic choice that assigns each choice option a utility, along with a salience parameter reflecting economic frictions. We characterize our model behaviorally and investigate its comparative statics properties. We show that the model generates intuitive closed-form solutions in equilibrium settings where firms can choose price, quality, and advertising. In addition, we show that the model allows for flexible substitution patterns and changes in market shares across choice sets. We demonstrate that our model can be easily identified and can outperform alternatives in demand prediction. (JEL D11, D21, D43, M37)

We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying “true” preference. Our conditions are weak and, therefore, valid in a wide range of economic environments. We develop applications to expected utility theory, choice over consumption bundles, and menu choice. Our framework unifies the revealed preference tradition with models that allow for errors.

Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming statewise monotonicity and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly chosen problem—the random problem selection mechanism—is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism. Paying for every period is similarly justified when we assume only a “no complementarities at the top” condition. To help experimenters decide which is appropriate for their particular experiment, we discuss empirical tests of these two assumptions.