We examine the incidence of disciplinary events that reduce the control of current managers, and corporate restructuring among firms experiencing a large decline in operating performance during an active takeover period (1985–1988) and a less active period (1989–1992). We document a significant decline in the disciplinary events from the active to the less active period that is driven by a significant decline in disciplinary takeovers, those takeovers that result in a top executive change. Following the performance decline, however, there is a substantial amount of corporate restructuring, and a significant improvement in operating performance, during both the active and the less active takeover period. We conclude that, although some managerial disciplinary events are related to overall takeover activity, the decline in takeover activity does not result in fewer performance-enhancing restructurings following performance declines.

This paper explains why firms with identical opportunities may use different technologies and offer different wages. Our key assumption is that workers must engage in costly search in order to gather information about jobs (Stigler (1961)). In equilibrium, some firms adopt high fixed cost, high productivity technologies, offer high wages, and fill job openings quickly. Other firms adopt less capital-intensive technologies and offer low wages, hiring mostly uninformed workers. In equilibrium, the amount of wage dispersion leaves workers indifferent about whether to gather information, and the fraction of informed workers leaves firms indifferent about their wage and technology choice. We show that worker search, which would appear to be a rent-seeking activity in partial equilibrium, may be efficiency-enhancing in general equilibrium.

We analyze market reaction to targeted stock issuances and investigate possible motives for their use. We find a statistically significant abnormal return of 3.61% within a three-day window around the announcement of proposed targeted stock issuances, possibly attributable to greater information on targeted stock segments as well as monitoring and motivational advantages. We find lower tax-loss carry forwards among firms that issue targeted stock compared to those that spin off segments, suggesting that tax reasons motivate targeted stock use. The return and cash flows of targeted stocks are affected more by their common corporate affiliation, although industry influences remain strong.

We investigate pricing relations and the potential for arbitrage in the U.S. Treasury STRIPS market, stressing the importance of reconciling quoted Treasury data with actual market pricing conventions. We document that stripping and reconstitution profits in the STRIPS market are fleeting and rarely economically significant; that matched-maturity principal and coupon STRIPS generally have different prices due, at least in part, to richness or cheapness in the underlying note or bond; and that apparent negative forward rates in the STRIPS market are concentrated in certain long-maturity STRIPS that do not actually exist at the time.

We examine the impact of merger announcements on portfolios of acquiring firm and target firm common stock from 1919 to 1930. Despite vast changes in the economic and regulatory environment, overall acquisition profitability has remained remarkably constant over the last 70 to 80 years. Target firm shareholders in the 1920s clearly gained from takeovers, averaging abnormal returns in excess of 15%, while acquiring firm shareholders essentially broke even. Synergistic or monopolistic gains from consolidation were minimal. Unlike the more recent experience, target firm and acquiring firm abnormal returns were largely unaffected by the mode of acquisition, the means of financing, or the degree of industrial relatedness.

The invisible hand is not a power that makes the good of one the good of all, and it is not any of a number of other things it is said to be. It is simply the inducement a merchant has to keep his capital at home, thereby increasing the domestic capital stock and enhancing military power, both of which are in the public interest and neither of which he intended. Smith's exposition discloses how his rhetorical sallies could disfigure his economics, confuse his argument for free trade, and make him play fast and loose with facts and the ideas of others.

Lawrence D. Brown, Jerry C. Y. Han, Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect the Implications of Current Earnings for Future Earnings for AR1 Firms?, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pp. 149-164

Joseph D. Piotroski, Value Investing: The Use of Historical Financial Statement Information to Separate Winners from Losers, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, Supplement: Studies on Accounting Information and the Economics of the Firm (2000), pp. 1-41