ABSTRACT This study examines how the source and nature of reporting standards jointly influence compliance with those standards. More specifically, I examine how decision makers' identification with the source of the standards moderates compliance with different types of standards. Type refers to whether the accounting standard is descriptive or injunctive (i.e., prescriptive). Source refers to the entity promulgating the accounting standards. I conduct three experiments in which participants face a direct trade-off between reporting aggressively to maximize their personal wealth and reporting conservatively to adhere to a standard. I find that identification with the source causes less aggressive reporting for an injunctive standard, but when a standard is descriptive, identification has no effect or an opposite effect. When identification with the source is low, descriptive standards tend to work well compared to injunctive standards. With injunctive standards, persuasive factors, such as identification, likely influence financial managers' aggressive reporting behavior.

ABSTRACT Regulators and researchers provide evidence that auditors' judgment quality is problematic in complex audit tasks. We introduce a framework for improving auditor judgment in these tasks. The framework builds on dual‐process theory to recognize that high‐quality judgment in complex tasks requires that auditors (i) possess the knowledge needed for the task, (ii) recognize the need for analytical (versus heuristic) processing, and (iii) have sufficient cognitive capacity to complete the analytical processing. Based on the framework, we predict that auditors' need for cognition (NFC), a characteristic theoretically linked to recognizing the need for analytical processing, is associated with higher quality complex judgments. Analysis of 11 studies supports this assertion. We demonstrate the usefulness of the framework by predicting and finding that priming auditors with an accuracy goal improves judgments, particularly for lower NFC auditors, who are less likely to spontaneously engage in analytical processing. The framework facilitates systematic development of interventions to improve auditor judgment by highlighting that solutions should address the specific conditions causing judgment problems.

ABSTRACT Auditors experience significant problems auditing complex accounting estimates, and this increasingly puts financial reporting quality at risk. Based on analyses of the specific errors that auditors commit, we propose that auditors need to be able to think more broadly and incorporate information from a variety of sources in order to improve audit quality for these important accounts. We experimentally demonstrate that a deliberative mindset intervention improves auditors’ ability to identify unreasonable estimates by improving their ability to identify and incorporate into their analyses contradictory information from diverse parts of the audit and improving their ability to think critically about the evidence. We perform additional analyses to demonstrate that our intervention improves auditor performance by causing them to think differently rather than simply to work harder. We demonstrate that critical thinking can improve the identification of unreasonable estimates and, in doing so, we provide new directions for addressing audit quality issues.

ABSTRACT Recent accounting research indicates that capital markets price firms' greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and that disclosed emissions levels are negatively associated with firms' market values. The departure point for this study is to investigate whether investors value firms differently based on the strategies firms use to mitigate GHG emissions. These strategies include making operational changes, which reduces emissions attributable to the firm, and purchasing offsets, which reduces emissions unattributable to the firm. Using an experiment, we hold constant a firm's financial performance, investment in emissions mitigation, and net emissions, and find evidence that nonprofessional investors perceive the firm to be more valuable when it primarily uses an operational change strategy versus an offsets strategy. However, consistent with theory, this result only occurs when the firm's prior sustainability performance is below the industry average and not when it is above the industry average. This difference in firm value is consistent with the notion that nonprofessional investors believe information about a firm's emissions management strategy is material. Supplemental exploratory analyses reveal that our results are mediated by investors' perception that an operational change strategy is more socially and environmentally responsible than an offsets strategy for below industry average firms. Implications for our findings on theory and practice are discussed.

Many CEOs engage in activism by publicly expressing their views on social, environmental, and political issues, while other CEOs refrain from doing so—a behavior we term CEO inactivism. We use two experiments to examine how CEO (in)activism impacts investor decisions. Our results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. When a CEO expresses an activist position that is consistent versus inconsistent with investors' views, investors invest more in the CEO's firm because they perceive the CEO more positively. We also find that CEO inactivism can lead to investment decisions that are as favorable as when the CEO expresses a position consistent with investors' views; our process evidence suggests that this may occur because CEO inactivism increases the likelihood that investors believe the CEO shares their position on a social issue. Finally, we do not find evidence that investor decisions are influenced by whether CEO (in)activism is in response to an external prompt. This study contributes to the emerging literature on CEO activism, a unique form of voluntary disclosure, by providing evidence about how CEO (in)activism influences investors. We also contribute to the literature examining the impact of social media disclosure on investor decisions. Finally, our findings have practical implications for CEOs, who increasingly face external pressures to engage in activism.

ABSTRACT Research suggests that employees work harder under penalty contracts than under economically equivalent bonus contracts. We build on this literature by examining how the motivational advantage of penalty contracts depends on a common aspect of real-world contracts: payoff ambiguity. With payoff ambiguity, employees provide effort without knowing how much pay they will receive for a given level of performance. According to our theory, this ambiguity opens the door for employee optimism, which has contrasting effects under each contract frame. Results from an experiment support this theory, with an increase in ambiguity leading to less employee effort with penalty contracts (as employees optimistically expect small penalties) and more effort with bonus contracts (as employees optimistically expect large bonuses). We also find that these effects are stronger for more dispositionally optimistic employees. Overall, our results suggest that bonus contracts may be more motivating and penalty contracts less motivating than previously thought.