Abstract We present a model in which investment capacity is reallocated in response to aggregate shocks and examine the resulting general equilibrium effects. The theory predicts a positive association between aggregate liquidity shocks, cost of capital, and conservative accounting. When capital becomes scarce, the accounting system is designed to preserve collateral, which depletes the supply of traded capital and leads to a higher cost of capital. The economy may accelerate small shocks with large (discontinuous) readjustments in financial reporting policies, cost of capital, and investment activity. We show that accounting policies set by firms to increase their market value may imply multiple equilibria, with self‐fulfilling inefficient equilibria exhibiting excessive collateral requirements and reduced aggregate investment.

ABSTRACT How should a firm measure a productive asset used as collateral? To answer this question, we develop a model in which firms borrow funds subject to collateral constraints. We characterize the qualities of optimal asset measurements and analyze their interactions with financing needs, collateral constraints, and interest rates. Because of real effects, complete transparency would reduce contracting efficiency and, hence, the measurement must be suitably adapted to credit conditions. The optimal measurement is asymmetric and reports precise information about high collateral values if credit frictions are low, but the reverse if credit frictions are high. Tighter credit market conditions may lead to more opaque measurements and increased investment, in the form of inefficient continuations.

ABSTRACT This article develops a theory of standard-setting in which accounting standards emerge endogenously from an institutional bargaining process. It provides a unified framework with investment and voluntary disclosure to examine the links between regulatory institutions and accounting choice. We show that disclosure rules tend to be more comprehensive when controlled by a self-regulated professional organization than when they are under the direct oversight of elected politicians. These institutions may not implement standards desirable to diversified investors and, when voluntary disclosures are possible, allowing choice between competing standards increases market value over a single uniform standard. Several new testable hypotheses are also offered to explain differences in accounting regulations. JEL Classifications: C78; D02; D04; D71; D72; D79; G28; L51; M41; M48.

ABSTRACT We model an information mosaic in which multiple signals—one gathered by an informed trader and the other publicly disclosed by the manager of the firm—are combined to estimate firm value. Under testable conditions, voluntary disclosures lead to higher ex ante information asymmetry and expected profits for the informed trader by allowing him to refine his trading strategy and complete his information mosaic. The informed trader's ability to combine information and enhance his advantage is more prevalent when there is more uncertainty about whether the news is favorable or unfavorable, the manager is more likely to be informed, and the manager's information is precise (i.e., disclosure quality is high). JEL Classifications: G14; D82; M48.

ABSTRACT Does managing the production of information add value in economic environments where a manager may claim to be uninformed and withhold unfavorable news? We examine this question by nesting an optimal persuasion mechanism, controlling how evidence is organized, within a voluntary disclosure framework. Information has productive consequences because the firm uses it to make a continuous operating decision. The optimal reporting strategy features coarse information at the most unfavorable reported event if and only if the firm bears penalties for nondisclosure or positive disclosure costs. The model demonstrates the optimality of imprecise information over bad news in a voluntary disclosure environment, and that such imprecision increases the quality of public signals after considering strategic disclosure effects.

ABSTRACT Using misstatement data, we find that the distribution of detected fraud features a heavy tail. We propose a theoretical mechanism that explains such a relatively high frequency of extreme frauds. In our dynamic model, a manager manipulates earnings for personal gain. A monitor of uncertain quality can detect fraud and punish the manager. As the monitor fails to detect fraud, the manager's posterior belief about the monitor's effectiveness decreases. Over time, the manager's learning leads to a slippery slope, in which the size of frauds grows steeply, and to a power law for detected fraud. Empirical analyses corroborate the slippery slope and the learning channel. As a policy implication, we establish that a higher detection intensity can increase fraud by enabling the manager to identify an ineffective monitor more quickly. Further, nondetection of frauds below a materiality threshold, paired with a sufficiently steep punishment scheme, can prevent large frauds.