We examine the effect of higher wages on firm performance during the 2008 financial crisis. To identify variation in wages, we rely on heterogeneity in the timing of long-term wage agreements for a sample of U.K. firms. We instrument for firms signing long-term agreements overlapping with the crisis by the presence of a contract signed in 2006 or earlier and expiring before September 2008. Treated firms not only paid higher wages but also realized greater labor productivity relative to control firms. These findings are consistent with the intuition that opportunity cost differentials between treated and control firms induce employees to exert higher effort. (JEL J41, J30, J24, G01) Received February 28, 2019; editorial decision July 8, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

This paper exploits intertemporal variations in employment protection across countries and finds that rigidities in labor markets are an important determinant of firms' capital structure decisions. Over the 1985–2007 period, we find that reforms increasing employment protection are associated with a 187 basis point reduction in leverage. We interpret this finding to suggest that employment protection increases operating leverage, crowding out financial leverage. This result does not appear to be due to pretreatment differences between treated and control firms, omitted variables, unobserved changes in regional economic conditions, and reverse causality. Heterogeneous treatment effects are consistent with our economic intuition.

We show a negative effect of opioid prescriptions on subsequent individual employment among employers in our sample using doctor-opioid-prescribing propensity as our instrument. This finding has implications for firms that must now contend with lower local labor supply. We find a negative relationship between opioid prescriptions and subsequent establishment growth. However, firms respond to labor shortages by investing more in technology, replacing the relatively scarcer labor with capital, especially when they are not financially constrained. We find positive abnormal returns, upon the passage of state laws intended to limit opioid prescriptions, that are driven by firms more reliant on labor.

Financial regulators and investors have expressed concerns about high pay inequality within firms. Using a proprietary data set of public and private firms, this paper shows that firms with higher pay inequality—relative wage differentials between top- and bottom-level jobs—are larger and have higher valuations and stronger operating performance. Moreover, firms with higher pay inequality exhibit larger equity returns and greater earnings surprises, suggesting that pay inequality is not fully priced by the market. Our results support the notion that differences in pay inequality across firms are a reflection of differences in managerial talent. Received March 14, 2016; editorial decision January 21, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

Financial regulators and investors have expressed concerns about high pay inequality within firms. Using a proprietary data set of public and private firms, this paper shows that firms with higher pay inequality—relative wage differentials between top-and bottom-level jobs—are larger and have higher valuations and stronger operating performance. Moreover, firms with higher pay inequality exhibit larger equity returns and greater earnings surprises, suggesting that pay inequality is not fully priced by the market. Our results support the notion that differences in pay inequality across firms are a reflection of differences in managerial talent.

We discuss firm-level evidence based on UK data showing that within-firm pay inequality--wage differentials between top- and bottom-level jobs--increases with firm size. Moreover, within-firm pay inequality rises as firms grow larger over time. Lastly, using wage data from 15 developed countries, we document a positive association between aggregate wage inequality at the country level and growth by the largest firms in the country. We conclude that part of what may be perceived as a global trend toward more wage inequality may be driven by an increase in the size of the largest firms in the economy.

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an important mechanism through which technology is adopted by firms. Firms with greater technological skill acquire less tech-savvy firms and, subsequently, increase technology investment at the target. This has important implications for labor reallocation following M&As. We show that target establishments become less routine intensive post-M&A, especially when a target had greater routine occupational employment, compared to its acquirer, ex-ante. We also provide evidence consistent with targets investing in information technology which tends to displace more office routine occupations. Such labor reallocation impacts wages, resulting in higher pay inequality within target establishments.

This paper exploits intertemporal variations in employment protection across countries and finds that rigidities in labor markets are an important determinant of firms' capital structure decisions. Over the 1985–2007 period, we find that reforms increasing employment protection are associated with a 187 basis point reduction in leverage. We interpret this finding to suggest that employment protection increases operating leverage, crowding out financial leverage. This result does not appear to be due to pretreatment differences between treated and control firms, omitted variables, unobserved changes in regional economic conditions, and reverse causality. Heterogeneous treatment effects are consistent with our economic intuition.

Following state-level legal changes that increase labor dismissal costs, firms increase their innovation in new processes that facilitate the adoption of cost-saving production methods, especially in industries with a large share of labor costs in total costs. Firms with high innovation ability exhibit larger increases in process innovation and capital-labor ratios, an effect driven by both increases in capital investment and decreases in employment. By facilitating the adjustment of the input mix when conditions in input markets change, innovation ability allows firms to mitigate value losses and is a key driver of their performance.