We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally imitated. Imitators may “enter” the market by imitating the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting dramatically affects the need for patent protection. Our results show that (i) imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist; (ii) the inventor sells knowledge through contracts that allow resale by the imitators; and (iii) under certain conditions, the inventor’s payoff increases with the number of imitators.

An informer sequentially collects and disseminates information through costly research to persuade an evaluator to approve an activity. Payoffs and control rights are split between informer and evaluator depending on the organizational rules governing the approval process. The welfare benchmark corresponds to Wald’s classic solution for a statistician with payoff equal to the sum of informer and evaluator. Organizations with different commitment power of informer and evaluator are compared from a positive and normative perspective. Granting authority to the informer is socially optimal when information acquisition is sufficiently costly. The analysis is applied to the regulatory process for drug approval. (JEL D82, D83, I18, L51, L65, O31)

The production of knowledge relies on collaborations between researchers. However, we do not know to what extent policies may stimulate these interactions. In this paper we show how a large-scale public “research cluster” policy in France, which funds local communities of researchers working on a common theme, affects the organization of research. Relying on an identification strategy based on grades awarded by reviewers, we show that members of financed clusters increase their collaborations with other cluster members by up to 30%. Paradoxically, researchers not at the core of the cluster topic benefit the most from the policy.

Introducing a new measure of scientific proximity between private firms and public research groups and exploiting a multibillion-euro financing program of academic clusters in France, we provide causal evidence of local spillovers from academic research to firms in the private sector. Our main estimate suggests that each €1 spent in academic research through this program spurred an additional €0.81 in private R&D expenditures. We also show that this shock increased the average quality of patents. We exploit reports produced by funded clusters, complemented by data on firm creation, labor mobility, and R&D public–private partnerships, to provide evidence on the channels for these spillovers. We discuss the policy implications of funding academic research to stimulate private R&D.

How do radical reforms shape economic development over time? In 1790, the French Constituent Assembly overhauled the kingdom’s organization to establish new local capitals. In some departments, the choice of local capitals over rival candidate cities was plausibly exogenous. We study how changes in administrative presence affect state capacity and development in the ensuing decades. In the short run, administrative proximity increases taxation and investments in law enforcement. In the long run, capitals obtain more public goods and grow faster. Our results shed light on the dynamic impacts of state building following one of history’s most ambitious administrative reforms. (JEL D70, H41, H71, O18, O43)

Distributional and Efficiency Impacts of Gasoline Taxes: An Econometrically Based Multi-market Study by Antonio M. Bento, Lawrence H. Goulder, Emeric Henry, Mark R. Jacobsen and Roger H. von Haefen. Published in volume 95, issue 2, pages 282-287 of American Economic Review, May 2005