The existence of an intra-day seasonality component in financial market variables (volatility, volume, activity, etc.) has been highlighted in many previous studies. To remove this cyclical component from raw data, many researchers use the intra-day average observations model (IAOM) and/or some smoothing techniques (e.g. the kernel method). When the seasonality is related to the first moment (the conditional expectation) and involves only a deterministic component, the IAOM method succeeds in estimating the periodicity almost perfectly. However, when seasonality affects the first or the second moment (the conditional variance) of the data and contains both deterministic and stochastic components, both IAOM and the kernel method fail to capture it. We introduce self-organizing maps (SOM) as a solution. SOM are based on neural network learning and nonlinear projections. Their flexibility allows seasonality to be captured even in the presence of stochastic cycles.

Surprisingly few papers have attempted to develop a direct empirical test for overbidding in merger and acquisition contests. We develop such a test grounded on a necessary condition for profit-maximizing bidding behavior. The test is not subject to endogeneity concerns. Our results strongly support the existence of overbidding. We provide evidence that overbidding is related to conflicts of interest, but also some indirect evidence that it arises from failing to fully account for the winner’s curse.

The method of payment choice in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions has been the subject of much research in the finance literature. But significant changes in the economic environment of acquirers in the U.S. call into question whether known stylized facts are still valid and motivate us to undertake new empirical analyses. Using a large sample of M&A transactions spanning the last two decades, we investigate the financial constraints versus ownership dilution tradeoff that potentially drives negotiations about the method of payment (i.e., stock or cash), controlling for an extensive list of other potential determinants. The main takeaway from our analyses is that financial constraints are a dominant factor motivating acquirers to include stock (at least partially) in the method of payment package in M&A transactions in the recent period.

Economic, political, and public policy uncertainty affect merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. In this paper, we use Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) interventions in the M&A market to investigate whether regulatory interventions also matter. Our results support this conjecture. Using the Hoberg and Phillips (2010) similarity scores to identify product market competitors, we confirm a clear and significant DOJ/FTC regulatory enforcements' deterrence effect on future M&A transaction activity, a result robust to many alternative specifications. Additional evidence indicates that this deterrence effect is (at least partly) driven by both regulatory outcome uncertainty and regulatory intervention probability channels. Our results identify an (un)intended consequence of antitrust regulation that affects M&A activity.

On February 1, 2008, Microsoft offered $43.7billion for Yahoo. This offer was a milestone in the battle between Microsoft and Google to control the Internet search industry. The announcement accompanied a substantial decrease in Microsoft's stock price. Investors apparently considered the bid too high and doubted Microsoft's ability to create value with Yahoo's assets (the announcement combined returns implied a total value destruction of $13.29billion). Using the abnormal returns pattern of industry firms and customers, this article examines the sources of overbidding. Our analyses indicate that Microsoft's aggressive move is rooted in its rivalry with Google, but the personality traits of the involved CEOs might explain also a portion of the overbidding.

Recent academic studies indicate that acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) decline from deal to deal in acquisition programs. Does this pattern suggest hubristic CEO behaviors are significant enough to influence average CAR patterns during acquisition programs? An alternative explanation is CEO learning. This study therefore tests for learning using successive acquisitions of large U.S. public targets undertaken by U.S. acquirers. A dynamic framework reveals that both rational and hubristic CEOs take on average investor reactions to their previous deals into account and adjust their bidding behavior accordingly. These results are consistent with a learning hypothesis.

Recent empirical research has shown that, from deal to deal, serial acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are declining. This has been most often attributed to CEOs hubris. We question this interpretation. Our theoretical analysis shows that (i) a declining CAR from deal to deal is not sufficient to reveal the presence of hubris, (ii) if CEOs are learning, economically motivated and rational, a declining CAR from deal to deal should be observed, (iii) predictions can be derived about the impact of learning and hubris on the time between successive deals and, finally, (iv) predictions about the CAR and about the time between successive deal trends lead to testable empirical hypotheses.

Knowledge gleaned from previous acquisitions may confer valuation expertise and other benefits. But numerous acquisitions also entail costs, due to problems of incorporating diverse units into an ever larger firm. Such benefits and costs are not directly observable from outside the firm. This article proposes a simple model to infer their relative importance, using the time between successive deals. The data requirements are minimal and allow the use of all mergers and acquisitions during 1992–2009 (more than 300,000 deals). The results provide evidence of learning gains through repetitive acquisitions, especially under CEO continuity and when successive deals are more similar.

Many takeovers occur after one-on-one negotiations, which suggests a troubling lack of competition. We seek to determine whether acquirers in such friendly deals are truly insulated from competitive pressures. We study two countervailing influences: (1) potential but unobserved latent competition, i.e., the likelihood that rival bidders could appear, and (2) anticipated auction costs when negotiations fail. Using various proxies, we find that latent competition increases the bid premium offered in negotiated deals and that auction costs reduce the premium.

Acquisitions, mergers, and other business agreements face increasing regulatory scrutiny, even when they involve firms domiciled outside the territory of regulatory authorities. Recent examples include mergers between American firms that were approved by American regulators but blocked by European regulators. Regulatory reciprocity seems a likely future trend. There are obvious consequences for the successful completion of future business combinations. This paper explains the regulatory procedures of the European Commission with respect to business combinations, documents the price reactions of subject firms on dates from the initial announcement to the final regulatory decision, and studies whether European regulators tend to shield European firms from foreign competition. Our main results are: i) the market clearly reacts to European regulatory intervention even when the subject firms are non-European, ii) the probability of intervention is not related to the nationality of the bidder, however, iii) when intervention does occur, the market anticipates it will be more costly when the bidder is non-European, so protectionism cannot be rejected outright, and iv) regulatory interventions are anticipated by investors, so they affect the initial announcement returns.