How does lending-market competitiveness shape new firms’ financing? Using a unique U.S. representative panel of new firms, we document that in more concentrated local lending markets: (a) new firms are less likely to access credit; (b) new firms have lower leverage; and (c) the best-performing firms are more severely affected by reduced debt financing. We develop a contingent-claims model with monopolistically competitive banks that rationalizes these facts and shows how credit-market conditions determine loan fees and concentration. Our findings highlight banks’ market power as a channel through which the financial sector influences firms’ development and, hence, economic growth.

We document four secular trends about U.S. mortgage origination by traditional and FinTech lenders after the 2008-2009 financial crisis. First, since 2011, the overall number, size, and approval rate of small and medium-sized loans have been decreasing over time, relative to large loans. Second, the largest lenders redistribute their lending the most. Third, this loan-size redistribution of credit increases in the size of the lender. Fourth, the effects are stronger for mortgages further away from the conforming loan limit(s) in both directions. We argue that the supply of credit drives these secular trends, and we assess several potential economic mechanisms.

We isolate the information channel of peer effects in consumption in a setting that excludes a role for common shocks or social pressure—a spending panel paired with crowdsourced information about anonymous “peers” elicited at different times. Consumers converge to peers’ spending, and more so when peer signals are more informative. Convergence is asymmetric: within 12 months of information provision, overspenders close 17% and underspenders 5% of their gap relative to peers. We exploit the quasi-random assignment to peer groups in an instrumental-variable strategy and implement an experiment for external validity. Our results are consistent with information-based theories of overconsumption.

Historically, European Jews have specialized in financial services while being the victims of antisemitism. We find that the present-day demand for finance is lower in German counties where historical antisemitism was higher, compared to otherwise similar counties. Households in counties with high historical antisemitism have similar saving rates but invest less in stocks, hold lower saving deposits, and are less likely to get a mortgage to finance homeownership after controlling for wealth and a rich set of current and historical covariates. Present-day antisemitism and supply-side forces do not fully explain the results. Households in counties where historical antisemitism was higher distrust the financial sector more—a potential cultural externality of historical antisemitism that reduces wealth accumulation in the long run.

Binding lower bounds on interest rates and large government deficits limit the scope of fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate households’ spending through financial intermediaries and firms. Policy makers have thus been implementing unconventional policies that aim to increase households’ spending directly through managing their expectations. We first show theoretically and empirically that higher inflation expectations increase households’ consumption. We then design a difference-in-differences strategy to assess the effectiveness of unconventional fiscal policy and forward guidance, both of which aim to raise aggregate demand via managing expectations. Whereas unconventional fiscal policy increases households’ expectations and spending, forward guidance announcements do not

We study the nature and effects of cultural biases in choice under risk and uncertainty by comparing peer-to-peer loans the same individuals ( lenders ) make alone and after observing robo-advised suggestions. When unassisted, lenders are more likely to choose co-ethnic borrowers, facing 8% higher defaults and 7.3pp lower returns. Robo-advising does not affect diversification but reduces lending to high-risk co-ethnic borrowers. Lenders in locations with high inter-ethnic animus drive the results, even when borrowers reside elsewhere. Biased beliefs explain these results better than a conscious taste for discrimination: lenders rarely override robo-advised matches to ethnicities they discriminated against when unassisted.

We study the introduction of a wealth-management robo-adviser that constructs portfolios tailored to investors’ holdings and preferences. Adopters are similar to non-adopters in terms of demographics and prior interactions with human advisers but tend to be more active and have greater assets under management. Investors adopting robo-advising experience diversification benefits. Ex ante undiversified investors increase stock holdings and hold portfolios with less volatility and better returns. Already well-diversified investors hold fewer stocks, yet see some reduction in volatility, and trade more after adoption. All investors increase attention based on online account logins. We find that adopters exhibit declines in prominent behavioral biases, including the disposition, trend chasing, and rank effect. Our results emphasize the promises and pitfalls of robo-advising tools, which are becoming ubiquitous all over the world.Received May 31, 2017; editorial decision August 21, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang.

We use administrative and survey-based micro data to study the relationship between cognitive abilities (IQ), the formation of inflation expectations, and the consumption plans of a representative male population. High-IQ men display 50 % lower forecast errors for inflation than other men. High-IQ men, but not others, have consistent inflation expectations and perceptions over time. In terms of choice, only high-IQ men increase their consumption propensity when expecting higher inflation as the consumer Euler equation prescribes. Education levels, income, other expectations, and socio-economic status, although important, do not explain the variation in expectations and choice by IQ. Recent modelling attempts to incorporate boundedly rational agents into macro models do not fully capture all the facts we document. We discuss which dimensions of expectations formation and choice are important for heterogeneous-agents models of household consumption and for the transmission of fiscal and monetary policy.

The frequency with which firms adjust output prices helps explain persistent differences in capital structure across firms. Unconditionally, the most flexible-price firms have a 19% higher long-term leverage ratio than the most sticky-price firms, controlling for known determinants of capital structure. Sticky-price firms increased leverage more than flexible-price firms following the staggered implementation of bank deregulation across states and over time, which we use in a difference-in-differences strategy. Firms’ frequency of price adjustment did not change around the deregulation.

Consumers rely on the price changes of goods in their grocery bundles when forming expectations about aggregate inflation. We use micro data that uniquely match individual expectations, detailed information about consumption bundles, and item-level prices. The weights consumers assign to price changes depend on the frequency of purchase, rather than expenditure share, and positive price changes loom larger than negative price changes. Prices of goods offered in the same store but not purchased do not affect inflation expectations, nor do other dimensions. Our results provide empirical guidance for models of expectations formation with heterogeneous consumers.