Using a sample of emerging market closed-end funds, I find evidence that indirect investment barriers exert powerful effects on asset pricing differences across countries. I show that not only do indirect investment barriers contribute to international capital market segmentation, but also they can lead to segmentation even in the absence of strong capital inflow restrictions. This result is consistent with Bekaert and Harvey's (1995) conclusion that “other markets appear segmented even though foreigners have relatively free access to their capital markets” (p. 403). The empirical results of this paper provide a rational market segmentation explanation of both premiums and discounts in emerging market closed-end funds, and they are consistent with the deterrent effect of indirect barriers on equity flows to emerging markets found in the capital flow literature.

Using the universe of business development companies (BDCs), a unique publicly traded segment of U.S. Private Equity (PE), for the period 1998–2017, we provide the first in-depth examination of their performance and risk-adjusted characteristics and compare our results to contrasting evidence derived from recently developed time series proxies for unlisted PE returns. BDCs exhibit zero alpha, beta of one, and significant exposure to SMB, HML, and CMA factors of 0.5, 0.7, and -0.3, respectively. BDC performance and market beta are sensitive to fund size and leverage. We provide evidence that BDC returns capture both the asset selection and PE ownership elements of the unlisted PE investment strategy. Finally, an event study analysis shows that NAV disclosures become informative only after the adoption of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 157 (SFAS 157). We posit that BDCs provide a readily available market-based PE benchmark for use by regulators, market participants, and academics.

We investigate the link between stock and options markets during the 2008 U.S. short sale ban. First, we find definitive evidence that the ban indeed caused stock overvaluation. Second, we show that the short sale ban caused a significant increase in put-call parity violations only in the direction of the short sale constraints and it significantly enhanced the stock return predictability of put-call parity violations. Third, the overvaluation is really large. A portfolio formed on the trading signal that the put-call parity violation is in the top quintile underperforms the lowest quintile portfolio by a statistically and economically significant abnormal daily return of 5.6% during the short sale ban period. We employ a novel and rigorous method of using TAQ intraday data to ensure that our high-low violation arbitrage portfolio as well as the five Fama-French factors used to estimate the abnormal returns are implementable by a hypothetical investor exempt from the shorting ban.

Until 2004, the London Stock Exchange allowed firms to be traded in the specialized SEAQ-I platform without the firm's involvement. Trading only required an application by one LSE trading member firm. Such an institutional arrangement, which made cross-listings possible without a firms' approval, allows for a direct test of different theories of foreign listing. In particular, we can differentiate between market segmentation and liquidity hypotheses, which rely on a firm trading in a foreign exchange and informational hypotheses, which assume that a firm makes the decision to trade in a foreign exchange. We identify a sample of international firms that are admitted to trading on London's SEAQ-I platform without their involvement. We estimate the valuation effects of this multi-market trading event and compare them to those enjoyed by firms that pursue a standard London Stock Exchange cross-listing. A cross-sectional abnormal returns analysis documents significant evidence in support of information-related hypotheses of cross-listing. An analysis of the firms' home market price volatility corroborates the results.

Using daily abnormal currency returns for the universe of countries with flexible exchange rates, we show local currency depreciations ahead of unscheduled, public sovereign debt downgrade announcements. Consistent with the private information hypothesis, the effect is stronger in lower institutional quality countries and holds after we control for concurrent public information and for publicly available rumors about the forthcoming downgrades. Our results persist when abnormal currency returns are adjusted for global carry and dollar risk factors, world equity and bond returns, as well as local stock market returns. Finally, the currency depreciations are permanent, providing evidence for a link between fundamentals and currency markets.

Rating agencies consult with local government officials several days prior to official announcements of sovereign debt rating changes, making information leakage likely. Using cross-country data from 1988 to 2012, we find evidence of information leakage. In particular, we find statistically and economically significant negative daily abnormal stock index returns prior to downgrade announcements. These effects are more pronounced in countries with lower institutional quality, and they persist during times with no downgrade rumors and no concurrent bad news in general. A mild post-announcement reversal consistent with overreaction to pre-event downgrade rumors highlights the adverse effects of such leakage and, thus, should be a policy concern for capital market regulators.