This paper examines the role of certain fair value accounting (FVA) outcomes in compensation of US bank CEOs. The use of FVA in compensation invites an agency cost—the clawback problem—if cash compensation is based on unrealized profits that may reverse in the future. At the same time FVA may be a good measure of current managerial effort and so be cash compensated. We find evidence consistent with a positive link between CEO cash bonus and fair value (FV) valuation of trading assets, managed for short-term profit, as well as (amongst banks with limited trading exposure) a positive link between CEO pay and FV valuations of available for sale (AFS) assets. We find no evidence that trading income is incrementally compensation relevant, indicating that compensation committees avoided the clawback problem for unrealized trading gains. The paper also provides evidence on the link between FVA outcomes and equity-based pay.

Prior research reports that analysts focus on street earnings, which are measures that typically exceed GAAP earnings. Using a sample of CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2016 we show that the likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover - but not voluntary turnover - are higher when analysts exclude income-decreasing items. The association between exclusions and forced turnovers is particularly pronounced for high magnitude exclusions. We also show that greater street exclusion of income-decreasing items, the lower CEO bonus payouts. We find that boards use audited and more conservative GAAP earnings in evaluating and dismissing CEOs, except in the recent period of 2010–2016.

This paper examines the relation between the investment horizon of banks and their CEO compensation, and its consequences for risk and performance. We find that banks with short-term investment intensity pay more cash bonus, exhibit higher risk and perform more poorly than banks with longer-term investment intensity. This evidence is broadly consistent with the view that short-term means of compensation encouraged a short-term investment focus, which in turn led to both higher risk and resulted in poorer performance, culminating in the sub-prime crisis. The inverse risk-performance relation suggests pay schemes were incongruent with shareholders’ interest. Moreover, pay arrangements used in banks prior to the subprime crisis exposed banks to the ex-post settling up problem (the clawback problem).

ABSTRACT We provide evidence on effort coordination and information sharing between audit committees and external auditors. We use four effort measures: the risk areas reported by both the auditor and committee, auditor-reported materiality, and committee meetings. We find that the number of risks reported by the auditor (committee) is positively related to the number of risks reported by the committee (auditor) and that lower materiality is associated with more risks that the committee discloses. The evidence also suggests that although risk areas are “sticky,” the committee identifies new risks faster, whereas the auditor focuses on shared risks. Next, our analysis indicates that audit process standardization influences reporting quality in a nonlinear manner. Finally, although audit fees tend to rise with auditor effort, they are unrelated to the committee’s effort. Our findings endorse the service perspective on auditing by emphasizing the collaborative nature of the audit process over individual actors’ self-interests. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; G38.