[I provide a revealed-preference-based framework that uses covenant prices and choices to quantitatively study how covenants generate firm benefits by completing debt contracts. I use a rational-expectations-based panel estimator of covenant prices, which does not require quasi-experimental variation, to circumvent the problem of endogenous covenant choices. I find that firms' surpluses exceed the spread paid on a loan. Leverage and interest-rate covenants produce the largest benefits, lending quantitative credence to several standard theories of covenants. Once covenants are chosen, the benefits from fine-tuning them are small, thus rationalizing "boilerplate" covenants. I conclude by discussing the extensions and limitations of my method.]

We argue and demonstrate that resource allocation within firms' internal capital markets provides an important force countervailing financial market dislocation. We estimate a structural model of internal capital markets to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation decision and illustrate how these forces interact with external capital market stress. The weaker (stronger) division obtains too much (little) capital, as though it is 12% (9%) more (less) productive than it really is. Out-of-sample simulated data are consistent with the actual data showing that internal capital markets offset financial market stress during the recent financial crisis by 16%–30%.

I provide a revealed-preference-based framework that uses covenant prices and choices to quantitatively study how covenants generate firm benefits by completing debt contracts. I use a rational-expectations-based panel estimator of covenant prices, which does not require quasi-experimental variation, to circumvent the problem of endogenous covenant choices. I find that firms' surpluses exceed the spread paid on a loan. Leverage and interest-rate covenants produce the largest benefits, lending quantitative credence to several standard theories of covenants. Once covenants are chosen, the benefits from fine-tuning them are small, thus rationalizing “boilerplate” covenants. I conclude by discussing the extensions and limitations of my method.

We argue and demonstrate that resource allocation within firms' internal capital markets provides an important force countervailing financial market dislocation. We estimate a structural model of internal capital markets to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation decision and illustrate how these forces interact with external capital market stress. The weaker (stronger) division obtains too much (little) capital, as though it is 12% (9%) more (less) productive than it really is. Out-of-sample simulated data are consistent with the actual data showing that internal capital markets offset financial market stress during the recent financial crisis by 16%–30%.

[Financial distress can disrupt a durable goods producer's provision of complementary goods and services such as warranties, spare parts and maintenance. This reduces consumers' demand for the core product, causing indirect costs of financial distress. We test this hypothesis in the market for used cars sold at wholesale auctions. An increase in a manufacturer's credit default swaps significantly decreases the prices of its cars at auction, especially cars with longer expected service lives. Our estimates imply substantial indirect costs of financial distress for car manufacturers. These costs have occasionally even exceeded the tax savings benefits for General Motors and Ford.]

Abstract This article studies the impact of the arbitrator selection process on consumer outcomes. Using data from consumer arbitration cases in the securities industry over the past two decades, where we observe detailed information on case characteristics, the randomly generated list of potential arbitrators presented to both parties, the selected arbitrator, and case outcomes, we establish several motivating facts. These facts suggest that firms hold an informational advantage over consumers in selecting arbitrators, resulting in industry-friendly arbitration outcomes. We then develop and calibrate a quantitative model of arbitrator selection in which firms hold an informational advantage in selecting arbitrators. Arbitrators, who are compensated only if chosen, compete with each other to be selected. The model allows us to decompose the firms’ advantage into two components: the advantage of choosing pro-industry arbitrators from a given pool and the equilibrium pro-industry tilt in the arbitration pool that arises because of arbitrator competition. Selecting arbitrators without the input of firms and consumers would increase consumer awards by $60,000 on average relative to the current system. Forty percent of this effect arises because the pool of arbitrators skews pro-industry due to competition. Even an informed consumer cannot avoid this pro-industry equilibrium effect. Counterfactuals suggest that redesigning the arbitrator selection mechanism for the benefit of consumers hinges on whether consumers are informed. Policies intended to benefit consumers, such as increasing arbitrator compensation or giving parties more choice, would benefit informed consumers but hurt the uninformed.

ABSTRACT The average FDIC loss from selling a failed bank is 28% of assets. We document that failed banks are predominantly sold to bidders within the same county, with similar assets business lines, when these bidders are well capitalized. Otherwise, they are acquired by less similar banks located further away. We interpret these facts within a model of auctions with budget constraints, in which poor capitalization of some potential acquirers drives a wedge between their willingness and ability to pay for failed banks. We document that this wedge drives misallocation, and partially explains the FDIC losses from failed bank sales.

We examine gender differences in misconduct punishment in the financial advisory industry. There is a “gender punishment gap”: following an incident of misconduct, female advisers are 20% more likely to lose their jobs and 30% less likely to find new jobs, relative to male advisers. The gender punishment gap is not driven by gender differences in occupation, productivity, nature of misconduct, or recidivism. The gap in hiring and firing dissipates at firms with a greater percentage of female managers and executives. We also explore the differential treatment of ethnic minority men and find similar patterns of “in-group” tolerance.

We document the economywide extent of misconduct among financial advisers and the associated labor market consequences. Seven percent of advisers have misconduct records, and this share reaches more than 15 percent at some of the largest firms. Roughly one-third of advisers with misconduct are repeat offenders. Approximately half of advisers lose their jobs after misconduct. The labor market partially undoes firm-level discipline by rehiring such advisers. Firms that persistently engage in misconduct coexist with firms that have clean records. We show that this phenomenon may be explained by some firms “specializing” in misconduct and catering to unsophisticated consumers.

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