This paper compares monopsonistic and competitive search equilibria. While the competitive equilibrium is efficient, the monopsonistic equilibrium is not: there is too much search, and the employment rate is too low.

This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model with sequential search in which a nondegenerate wage offer distribution is endogenously determined. We use this model to analyze the comparative statics effects of increases in unemployment compensation on the unemployment rate and aggregate welfare taking into account the induced change in the wage offer distribution. Our results differ significantly from the predictions of the standard "partial-partial" model. For example, one can expect a selective increase in unemployment compensation, made available to those who impute a relatively low value to leisure, to decrease the equilibrium rate of unemployment.

This paper compares monopsonistic and competitive search equilibria. While the competitive equilibrium is efficient, the monopsonistic equilibrium is not: there is too much search, and the employment rate is too low.

This article examines the effects of unemployment compensation finance in a labor market in which firms pay efficiency wages. Two self‐financing unemployment compensation systems are compared: one in which benefits are financed by a proportional payroll tax and another in which experience rating is introduced by taxing firms in proportion to their separations. We find that experience rating leads to less unemployment, less shirking, and higher output.

This article presents an equilibrium model of a dual labor market. Firms are assumed to be identical ex ante, and dualism arises endogenously. The dual labor market outcome is supported by efficiency wage and search considerations. Firms choose wage/effort requirement packages optimally given optimal search and effort choice by workers, and vice versa. We prove existence and investigate the occurrence and nature of dual labor market equilibria.

This paper extends models of search market equilibrium to incorporate general-equilibrium considerations. The model we treat is one with a single product market and a single labor market. An equilibrium distribution of prices and wages is the result of optimal price- and wage-setting behavior by firms in conjunction with optimal search by individuals. We prove the existence of a degenerate equilibrium and of a two-point dispersion equilibrium.

This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model with sequential search in which a nondegenerate wage offer distribution is endogenously determined. We use this model to analyze the comparative statics effects of increases in unemployment compensation on the unemployment rate and aggregate welfare taking into account the induced change in the wage offer distribution. Our results differ significantly from the predictions of the standard "partial-partial" model. For example, one can expect a selective increase in unemployment compensation, made available to those who impute a relatively low value to leisure, to decrease the equilibrium rate of unemployment.

This paper examines the problem of non-existence of a single-wage equilibrium in a simple search model with asymmetric information. A pure-strategy, symmetric Nash equilibrium fails to exist because adverse selection arising from steady-state considerations causes a non-concavity in the payoff function.

Using 1998 data, we show that the gender log wage gap in Sweden increases throughout the wage distribution and accelerates in the upper tail. We interpret this as a strong glass ceiling effect. We use quantile regression decompositions to examine whether this pattern can be ascribed primarily to gender differences in labor market characteristics or in the rewards to those characteristics. Even after extensive controls for gender differences in age, education (both level and field), sector, industry, and occupation, we find that the glass ceiling effect we see in the raw data persists to a considerable extent.

We analyse a model of equilibrium directed search in a large labour market. Each worker, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, makes a fixed, finite number of applications, a. We allow for the possibility of ex post competition should more than one vacancy want to hire the same worker. For each a, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all vacancies post the same wage. When a =1, the common posted wage lies between the competitive and monopsony levels, and equilibrium is efficient. When a > 1, all vacancies post the monopsony wage. Some workers fail to find a job, some find a job at the monopsony wage, and some - those for whom there is competition - get the competitive wage. Equilibrium is inefficient when a > 1; in particular, there is excessive vacancy creation. © 2006 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.