[Litigation against auditors has increased dramatically in recent years. Auditors can offset litigation risk in a number of ways, including improved audit quality and planning, increases in audit fees and increases in the issuance of modified opinions. Auditors can also adjust their client portfolios by becoming more selective in their choice of new clients and by withdrawing from high-risk engagements. We test the hypothesis that litigation risk motivates auditor resignations by comparing resignation companies with two groups of client companies that dismissed their auditors: one matched with the resignation companies on industry and year, and the other matched on year alone. We find resignation companies differ from dismissal companies along dimensions that capture the probability of litigation: financial distress, variance of abnormal returns, auditor independence, tenure and a modified (particularly going-concern) opinion. We also construct a litigation proxy based on a prior litigation-prediction model and find that the proxy is positively associated with the probability that the auditor will resign rather than be dismissed from the engagement. Our analysis is consistent with concerns expressed by the accounting profession that litigation pressures lead to the withdrawal of audit services for a segment of the market.]

I examine the association between audit committee quality and the quality of corporate internal control. While information on the quality of internal control is not generally available, companies changing auditors are required to disclose any internal control problems that were pointed out by their predecessor auditors. The empirical results are based on a comparison of companies disclosing such internal control problems with a control sample of companies changing auditors but not disclosing internal control problems. Audit committee quality is measured in three dimensions: its size, its independence, and its expertise. The internal control problems are observed at two levels of increasing seriousness: reportable conditions and material weaknesses. The sample time period precedes the effective dates of recent policy changes regarding audit committees. The results indicate that independent audit committees and audit committees with financial expertise are significantly less likely to be associated with the incidence of internal control problems. This is true for both levels of internal control problems. The results are consistent with recent policy emphasis on audit committee independence and expertise.

Abstract Industry classification is an important component of the methodological infrastructure of accounting research. Researchers have generally used the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system for assigning firms to industries. In 1999, the major statistical agencies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States began implementing the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The new scheme changes industry classification by introducing production as the basis for grouping firms, creating 358 new industries, extensively rearranging SIC categories, and establishing uniformity across all NAFTA nations. We examine the implications of the change for accounting research. We first assess NAICS's effectiveness in forming industry groups. Following Guenther and Rosman 1994, we use financial ratio variances to measure intra‐industry homogeneity and find that NAICS offers some improvement over the SIC system in defining manufacturing, transportation, and service industries. We also evaluate whether NAICS might have an impact on empirical research by reproducing part of Lang and Lundholm's 1996 study of information‐transfer and industry effects. Using SIC delineations, they focus on whether industry conditions or the level of competition is the main source of uncertainty resolved by earnings announcements. Across all levels of aggregation, we find inferences are similar using either SIC or NAICS. How‐ever, we also observe that the regression coefficients in Lang and Lundholm's model show smaller intra‐industry dispersion for NAICS, relative to SIC, definitions. Overall, the results suggest that NAICS definitions lead to more cohesive industries. Because of this, researchers may encounter some differences in using NAICS‐industry definitions, rather than SIC, but these will depend on research design and industry composition of the sample.

Abstract Litigation against auditors has increased dramatically in recent years. Auditors can offset litigation risk in a number of ways, including improved audit quality and planning, increases in audit fees and increases in the issuance of modified opinions. Auditors can also adjust their client portfolios by becoming more selective in their choice of new clients and by withdrawing from high-risk engagements. We test the hypothesis that litigation risk motivates auditor resignations by comparing resignation companies with two groups of client companies that dismissed their auditors: one matched with the resignation companies on industry and year, and the other matched on year alone. We find resignation companies differ from dismissal companies along dimensions that capture the probability of litigation: financial distress, variance of abnormal returns, auditor independence, tenure and a modified (particularly going-concern) opinion. We also construct a litigation proxy based on a prior litigation-prediction model and find that the proxy is positively associated with the probability that the auditor will resign rather than be dismissed from the engagement. Our analysis is consistent with concerns expressed by the accounting profession that litigation pressures lead to the withdrawal of audit services for a segment of the market.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 introduced integrated audits of internal control over financial reporting and the financial statements. Since the internal control and audit reports are joint products of the audit process, we examine whether the issuance of an internal control material weakness opinion (MWO) influences, other things equal, the issuance of a going concern audit opinion (GCO). Using a sample of financially stressed companies, we find that the issuance of a MWO increases the likelihood of a GCO, suggesting that auditors do respond to the uncertainty surrounding a MWO by issuing a GCO. Further analyses reveal that the positive association between MWO and GCO obtains for company-level material weaknesses, which are known to be difficult to “audit-around”, and for more litigious industries. We also compare these results with those for a Section 302 sample with manager-reported (but not audited) material weaknesses, and find that the material weakness reported under Section 302 does not impact the GCO. Hence, the auditors respond to the uncertainty surrounding material weaknesses only when they issue MWOs, and not due to the existence of material weaknesses per se – that is, the issuance of a MWO seems to induce further conservatism in the auditor’s GCO decision. We conclude that researchers and policymakers should consider the overall effect of Section 404 on the financial statement audit.

ABSTRACT We examine financing outcomes for small businesses seeking to sell public securities in a setting characterized by high information asymmetry, weak requirements for auditor participation, and a complete absence of Big N auditors. Issuers that raise capital from small, unsophisticated investors through crowdfunding, under the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation Crowdfunding (RegCF), often need no auditor attestation or need only weak attestation in the form of reviews, not audits, of their financial statements. We find that auditor reviews are positively associated with both the probability of crowdfunding success and the total amount raised. Further, we compare outcomes for issuers that procure auditor reviews voluntarily and mandatorily, and document that issuers with voluntary reviews have better outcomes. We conjecture that for issuers that voluntarily procure reviews, the reviews serve as signals of high future prospects. Finally, the positive effect of reviews is concentrated in PCAOB-registered auditors. JEL Classifications: G18; M41; M42; M48.

ABSTRACT We investigate the impact of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) first-time inspections of foreign accounting firms by examining abnormal accruals around the inspection year, and the value relevance of accounting numbers around the inspection report date, for their U.S. cross-listed clients. We document lower abnormal accruals in the post-inspection period, and greater value relevance of accounting numbers in the post-report period for clients of the inspected auditors, compared with non-cross-listed clients or clients of non-inspected auditors within the inspected countries. Comparisons of the PCAOB's joint inspections with PCAOB stand-alone inspections indicate that while both experience lower post-inspection abnormal accruals, the former benefit more than the latter. The value relevance measure, in contrast, shows greater increases for the PCAOB stand-alone inspections than for joint inspections. Comparing the inspection effects for auditors with and without deficiency reports, we find no systematic differences for accruals or for value relevance.

ABSTRACT Recent trends in corporate board composition indicate an increase in the appointment of directors with legal expertise. Using two financial reporting quality measures, accruals quality and discretionary accruals, we find—for a sample of Russell 1000 firms in 2003 and 2005—that the presence (and proportion) of directors with legal backgrounds on the audit committee is associated with higher financial reporting quality. These results obtain after controlling for accounting expertise on audit committees. Also, supplementary tests indicate a positive association between changes in legal expertise and changes in financial reporting quality, suggesting that legal expertise serves as a monitor rather than as a signal of financial reporting quality. Further, the two forms of expertise interact —i.e., the presence of directors with both forms of expertise enhances financial reporting quality, beyond the contribution of the individual forms of expertise. Additional tests suggest that the positive effects of legal expertise are greater in the post-SOX period compared with a pre-SOX year.