Taxation, Income shifting, Transfer Pricing, Tax reform act

We analyze the stock market’s valuation of electric utility “stranded costs” (i.e., costs that might become unrecoverable under deregulation), and investigate whether stranded costs that have arisen as a result of voluntary firm business decisions are valued differently from those that are more directly linked to regulatory mandates. Further, we study whether investor valuations differ across jurisdictions. Finally, we examine the relation between investor valuation of stranded costs and the decision by utilities to make stranded cost‐related disclosures in their financial statements voluntarily. We find that investors anticipate that, on average, approximately 10% of total stranded costs will be borne by utility shareholders. Stranded costs arising from voluntary operating or investing decisions made by utilities are valued more negatively than those associated with mandatory power purchase contracts, consistent with investors assigning a higher recovery probability to the latter. Investor valuations of stranded costs associated with utility generating investments do not differ systematically across jurisdictions. We find that stranded costs are valued less negatively for voluntary disclosers not just in the year of disclosure but also in the preceding two years, implying that it is not disclosure per se that favorably influences valuation. Voluntary disclosers operate in jurisdictions that have more clearly established stranded cost recovery mechanisms, suggesting that both stranded cost disclosure and valuation are prompted by reduction in uncertainty about recoverability.

This paper demonstrates that the evidence supporting the hypothesis that post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is caused by investors’ failure to incorporate the implications of current earnings for future earnings is (also) consistent with researchers’ over-differencing an already stationary time-series. Specifically, we show the evidence is driven by a subset of firms where over-differencing of quarterly earnings in estimating earnings surprises is most likely to have occurred. Given the persistence of the PEAD over time, our alternative explanation suggests that the prior research investigating the causes for the PEAD overestimates investors’ naivete.

We analyze market reaction to targeted stock issuances and investigate possible motives for their use. We find a statistically significant abnormal return of 3.61% within a three-day window around the announcement of proposed targeted stock issuances, possibly attributable to greater information on targeted stock segments as well as monitoring and motivational advantages. We find lower tax-loss carry forwards among firms that issue targeted stock compared to those that spin off segments, suggesting that tax reasons motivate targeted stock use. The return and cash flows of targeted stocks are affected more by their common corporate affiliation, although industry influences remain strong.

In this study of sell-side analysts’ forecasts, we explore the effects of analyst aptitude, learning-by-doing, and the internal environment of the brokerage house on forecast accuracy. Our results indicate that analysts’ aptitude and brokerage house characteristics are associated with forecast accuracy, while learning-by-doing is only associated with forecast accuracy when we do not control for analysts’ company-specific aptitude in forecasting. It is unlikely that this result is caused by measurement errors because it is robust when we use a sub-sample where we can accurately measure experience.

Quarterly earnings allow aggregation into annual earnings in four different ways. Fiscal year earnings is one measure of annual earnings, the others being earnings for annual periods ending at interim quarter-ends. We investigate earnings management in fiscal year earnings relative to these alternative measures of firms’ annual earnings. We confirm prior findings in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 99–126) of discontinuities around zero and prior year earnings in histograms of earnings. Subsequent research questions whether these discontinuities are evidence of earnings management. Using histograms of our alternative annual earnings measures, we offer evidence suggesting earnings management is responsible for the discontinuities.

We investigate the determinants of discretionary SFAS 106 choices of non-regulated firms. We find that more unionized firms are more likely to use immediate recognition, consistent with incentives to reduce labor renegotiation costs. Immediate recognition is more prevalent among post-adoption plan modifiers, particularly if their transition obligation is large, consistent with incentives to increase future reported earnings. Immediate recognition, together with post-adoption benefit plan reduction, frees future income from the transition obligation amortization expense and adds a positive component as negative prior service costs are amortized. Immediate recognition is less prevalent among firms with higher potential debt contracting costs.

Mounting nuclear plant decommissioning costs and utility deregulation focused attention on accounting for decommissioning liabilities. FASB's Exposure Draft 158-B proposes balance sheet recognition of the projected future decommissioning cost liability at initial plant commission. We expect market valuation of each dollar of decommissioning cost apportioned to utilities to vary with utility-specific factors related to the probability of cost recovery via rates. We find a more negative decommissioning cost/firm value association for utilities with higher business or financial risk. Also, equity value is significantly associated with total decommissioning cost across all nuclear units in which a utility has ownership interest.