Finance professionals commonly set prices based on the analysis of recently closed, comparable transactions. Using data on syndicated loans, we exploit the lag between loans’ closing dates and their inclusion in a widely used comparables database to identify the effect of past transactions on new transaction pricing. Comparables pricing is an important determinant of individual loan spreads, but a failure to account for overlap in information across loans leads to pricing mistakes. Comparables used repeatedly are overweighted as they develop redundant channels of influence on later transactions. Market conditions prevailing at the time a comparable was priced also unduly influence subsequent loans. Received May 23, 2016; editorial decision January 23, 2018 by Editor Robin Greenwood.

We propose that, by financing their own product sales through captive finance subsidiaries, durable goods manufacturers commit to higher resale values for their products in future periods. Using data on captive financing by the manufacturers of heavy equipment, we find that captive‐backed models have lower price depreciation. The evidence is consistent with captive finance helping manufacturers commit to ex‐post actions that support used machine prices. This, in turn, conveys higher pledgeability for captive‐backed products, even for individual machines financed by banks. Although motivated as a rent‐seeking device, captive financing generates positive spillovers by relaxing credit constraints.