The percentage of S&P 500 firms using multiyear accounting-based performance (MAP) incentives for CEOs increased from 16.5% in 1996 to 43.3% in 2008. The use and design of MAP incentives depend on the signal quality of accounting versus stock performance, shareholder horizons, strategic imperatives, and board independence. After the technology bubble, option expensing, and the publicity of option backdating, firms increasingly use stock-based MAP plans to replace options, resulting in changes in pay structure, but not in pay level. While firms respond to the evolving contracting environment, they consider firm characteristics and shareholder preferences and do not blindly follow the trend.

Motivated by the rising importance of international sourcing by US firms in recent decades, we study the influence of international sourcing on capital structure. We find that international sourcing has a significant negative influence on financial leverage. The negative influence is stronger in industries that have high R&D intensities and are financially constrained. However, the negative relation is mitigated when suppliers are from countries with strong legal environments and when the supplier markets are more competitive. Overall, our findings suggest that relationship-specific investments, supplier market characteristics, and financial market conditions are key determinants of the sourcing–leverage relation.

The percentage of S&P 500 firms using multiyear accounting-based performance (MAP) incentives for CEOs increased from 16.5% in 1996 to 43.3% in 2008. The use and design of MAP incentives depend on the signal quality of accounting versus stock performance, shareholder horizons, strategic imperatives, and board independence. After the technology bubble, option expensing, and the publicity of option backdating, firms increasingly use stock-based MAP plans to replace options, resulting in changes in pay structure, but not in pay level. While firms respond to the evolving contracting environment, they consider firm characteristics and shareholder preferences and do not blindly follow the trend. Received September 20, 2013; accepted November 20, 2015 by Editor David Denis.

Using a sample of over 99,000 firm year observations encompassing extgreater13,800 firms from 1978 to 2007, we analyze how changes in labor market conditions influence the disciplining effect of debt on employee productivity. We document that better (worse) outside employment opportunities weaken (strengthen) the disciplinary effect of debt on employee output. The influence of outside employment options on leverage-output relation is robust to various controls for endogeneity, including using instrumental variables, a quasi-natural experiment, both firm and industry-level analysis, alternative model specifications, and controls for employees' work conditions and changes in work efficiencies. Altogether, our findings highlight the importance of labor market conditions on the efficacy of corporate financial policies and our understanding of how these policies influence economic outcomes.

Consistent with predictions from the psychology literature, we find that stock prices co-move more (less) in culturally tight (loose) and collectivistic (individualistic) countries. Culture influences stock price synchronicity by affecting correlations in investors׳ trading activities and a country׳s information environment. Both market-wide and firm-specific variations are lower in tighter cultures. Individualism is mostly associated with higher firm-specific variations. Trade and financial openness weakens the effect of domestic culture on stock price comovements. These results hold for various robustness checks. Our study suggests that culture is an important omitted variable in the literature that investigates cross-country differences in stock price comovements.

ABSTRACT We examine how accounting‐based compensation plans influence a firm's contracts with its creditors. After granting long‐term accounting‐based compensation plans (LTAPs) to CEOs, firms pay lower spreads and have fewer restrictive covenants in new bank loans. Mechanisms leading to lower borrowing cost include improvements in debt repayment ability, reduced shareholder‐debtholder conflicts, and reduced risk‐taking incentives. Creditors view LTAPs as a substitute for monitoring, adjust covenant design based on LTAP features, and value plans with concave performance‐payout functions and reasonable performance targets. A firm's credit rating improves and CDS spread declines after LTAP grants, suggesting that LTAPs help reduce firms' credit risk.

ABSTRACT We use a hand‐collected sample of 1,628 S&P 1500 firms and more than 12,000 executives to examine how family firms compensate nonfamily executives. Family firms comprise a large percentage of firms around the world, and most of their executives are not members of the founding family. Moreover, the founding family's engagement in the firm alters agency conflicts, which in turn should influence the design of incentive compensation. However, there is no empirical evidence on whether and how the incentive compensation of nonfamily executives differs between family and nonfamily firms. Our study intends to fill this gap in the literature. Consistent with our predictions, nonfamily executives in family firms receive significantly less performance‐based pay and equity‐based pay. Family monitoring, risk aversion, and a reluctance to dilute family ownership all contribute to the pay differences. Although incentive pay and total pay are lower in family firms, nonfamily executives receive safer pay and enjoy greater job stability. An analysis of executives' moves across firms suggests that ownership structure, not executives' preferences, is more likely the driver of pay differences between family and nonfamily firms. Our findings suggest that researchers should consider founding family's engagement to avoid misleading inferences with regard to the determinants of incentive compensation, and our findings should help compensation consultants better understand and implement pay packages for family firms and nonfamily firms. The results also imply that uniform compensation regulations intended to improve the monitoring of executives in widely held firms may not be as effective in family firms.

We examine how firms estimate CEO-employee pay ratios in response to the CEO pay ratio rule, the first mandated pay inequality disclosure for U.S. firms. Our findings reveal that firms disclose lower pay ratios when they use more complex methods to identify the median employee. The relation between the estimation method and the disclosed pay ratio is stronger for firms headquartered in states with a greater societal aversion to income inequality and is weaker when CEO pay in the prior year is lower. Firms’ estimation choices do not merely represent selection bias or potentially omitted variables such as firm size, industry, compensation design complexity, or workforce composition – including the presence of foreign, temporary, seasonal, or highly paid employees. Although firms that use more complex methods to identify the median employee disclose lower pay ratios, we find no evidence of real changes in pay inequality among these firms. Our results suggest that some firms use estimation discretion to appear to conform to stakeholders’ preferences instead of taking real actions. These practices call into question the informativeness of CEO pay ratio disclosures, highlighting a potential cost of granting discretion in mandatory ESG disclosures.