I extend multi-unit auction estimation techniques to a setting in which firms can express cost complementarities over time. In the context of electricity markets, I show how the auction structure and bidding data can be used to estimate these complementarities, which in these markets arise due to startup costs. I find that startup costs are substantial and that taking them into account helps better explain firm bidding strategies and production patterns. As in other dynamic settings, I find that startup costs limit the ability of firms to change production over time, exacerbating fluctuations in market prices. These fluctuations can induce estimates of market power that ignore dynamic costs to overstate markup volatility, with predicted markups that can be even negative in periods of low demand. I show how accounting for startup costs can provide a natural correction for these markup biases.

Natural gas has replaced coal as the dominant fuel for US electricity generation. However, utilities in regulated US states have retired coal more slowly than others. We build a structural model of rate-of-return regulation during an energy transition where utilities face trade-offs between lowering costs and maintaining and using legacy capacity. A regulated utility facing carbon taxes lowers short-run coal generation 48 percent as much as a cost minimizer would. Thirty years after a sudden energy transition, a cost minimizer has retired 71 percent more coal capacity than the regulated utility. Alternative regulations may jeopardize affordability and reliability goals during energy transitions.

We assess the static and dynamic implications of alternative market-based policies limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the US cement industry. Our results highlight two countervailing market distortions. First, emissions regulation exacerbates distortions associated with the exercise of market power in the domestic cement market. Second, emissions “leakage” in trade-exposed markets offsets domestic emissions reductions. Taken together, these forces can result in social welfare losses under policy regimes that fully internalize the emissions externality. Market-based policies that incorporate design features to mitigate the exercise of market power and emissions leakage deliver welfare gains when damages from carbon emissions are high.

We develop a framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and restricted entry in arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using microdata from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In the presence of market power, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, reducing consumer costs but increasing deadweight loss.

We measure the pass-through of emissions costs to electricity prices. We perform both reduced-form and structural estimations based on optimal bidding in this market. Using rich micro-level data, we estimate the channels affecting pass-through in a flexible manner, with minimal functional form assumptions. Contrary to many studies in the general pass-through literature, we find that emissions costs are almost fully passed through to electricity prices. Since electricity is traded through high-frequency auctions for highly inelastic demand, firms have weak incentives to adjust markups after the cost shock. Furthermore, the costs of price adjustment are small.

We study the investment effects of market integration on renewable energy expansion. Our theory highlights that market integration not only improves allocative efficiency by gains from trade but also incentivizes new investment in renewable power plants. To test our theoretical predictions, we examine how recent grid expansions in the Chilean electricity market changed electricity production, wholesale prices, generation costs, and renewable investments. We then build a structural model of power plant entry to quantify the impact of market integration with and without the investment effects. We find that the market integration in Chile increased solar generation by around 180%, saved generation costs by 8%, and reduced carbon emissions by 5%. A substantial amount of renewable entry would not have occurred in the absence of market integration. Our findings suggest that ignoring these investment effects would substantially understate the benefits of market integration and its important role in expanding renewable energy.