In this paper a dynamic model of the provision of a public good with incomplete information is developed. For a finite population, in addition to the standard underprovision type of results, inefficiency occurs because of a delay in contributions. For an infinite population, although delay may disappear, underprovision remains so that equilibrium is still inefficient. Policy implications of these results are described, emphasis being put on possible government intervention with incomplete information.

In this paper a dynamic model of the provision of a public good with incomplete information is developed. For a finite population, in addition to the standard underprovision type of results, inefficiency occurs because of a delay in contributions. For an infinite population, although delay may disappear, underprovision remains so that equilibrium is still inefficient. Policy implications of these results are described, emphasis being put on possible government intervention with incomplete information.

This paper presents theory and evidence on the relationship between inequality and institutional quality. We exhibit a model in which the two may dynamically reinforce each other and set to test this relationship with a broad array of institutional measures. The double causality between institutional strength and a more equal distribution of income is empirically established using dynamic panel and linear feedback analysis.

Our analysis of the contribution of education to growth recognizes its dual role of building human capital and promoting a common culture. It indicates that when different cultural groups separately determine the cultural orientation of their school curricula this may result in excessive polarization and sub-optimal growth. The optimal trajectory involves a gradual, reciprocal convergence of school curricula towards the middle, but may be difficult to implement in a political context in which curricula are determined by legislative bargaining. Coercive centralization then results in overly rapid homogenization and may not be superior to a decentralized school system.