I develop a model where the sovereign debt capacity depends on the capitalization of domestic banks. Low-capital banks optimally tilt their government bond portfolio toward domestic securities, linking their destiny to that of the sovereign. If the sovereign risk is sufficiently high, low-capital banks lend less to the productive sector to further increase their holdings of domestic government bonds, lowering sovereign yields. In this case, a government that regulates bank capital faces a trade-off. On the one hand, high-capital banks lend more to the productive sector. On the other hand, low-capital banks support the home sovereign debt capacity.

We analyze the role of loan maturity and collateral eligibility in the transmission of central bank liquidity provisions to banks following a wholesale funding dry-up. We analyze the transmission of the three-year LTRO, which substantially extended the ECB liquidity maturity, in Italy, where banks benefited from a government guarantee program that effectively relaxed the ECB collateral requirements. Combining the national credit register with banks securities holdings, we find that (i) the maturity extension supported banks’ credit supply and (ii) banks used most liquidity to buy domestic government bonds and substitute missing wholesale funding, two possibly unstated goals of the intervention.

To safeguard its technological leadership, the U.S. has restricted domestic suppliers from exporting cutting-edge technologies to selected Chinese firms. Domestic firms affected by these export controls halt sales to Chinese customers, as intended, but struggle to establish new relations with alternative customers domestically or in politically aligned regions. Consequently, domestic suppliers experience sizable losses in market capitalization, along with reductions in profitability, employment, and bank lending. Chinese firms are more proactive in reconfiguring supply chains, though not without costs. Overall, export controls impose larger costs on U.S. firms developing the very technologies these policies aim to protect.

This paper examines the supply chain effects of the most damaging cyberattack in history so far. The attack propagated from the directly hit firms to their customers, causing a four-fold amplification of the initial drop in profits. These losses were larger for affected customers with fewer alternative suppliers. Internal liquidity buffers and increased borrowing, mainly through bank credit lines, helped firms navigate the shock. Nonetheless, the cyberattack led to persistent adjustments to the supply chain network, with affected customers terminating trading relations with directly hit firms and forming new ones with alternative suppliers with a stronger cybersecurity posture.

We document capital misallocation in the U.S. investment-grade (IG) corporate bond market, driven by quantitative easing (QE). Prospective fallen angels — risky firms just above the IG cutoff — enjoyed subsidized bond financing in 2009–19. This effect is driven by Fed purchases of securities inducing long-duration IG-focused investors to rebalance their portfolios towards higher-yielding IG bonds. The benefiting firms (i) exploited the sluggish downward adjustment of credit ratings after M&A to finance risky acquisitions with bond issuances, and (ii) increased market share affecting competitors’ employment and investment, but (iii) suffered severe downgrades at the onset of the pandemic.

ABSTRACT We analyze how regulatory constraints on household leverage—in the form of loan‐to‐income and loan‐to‐value limits—affect residential mortgage credit and house prices as well as other asset classes not directly targeted by the limits. Loan‐level data suggest that mortgage credit is reallocated from low‐ to high‐income borrowers and from urban to rural counties. This reallocation weakens the feedback between credit and house prices and slows house price growth in “hot” housing markets. Banks whose lending to households is more affected by the regulatory constraint drive this reallocation, but also substitute their risk‐taking into holdings of securities and corporate credit.

ABSTRACT We show that “zombie credit”—subsidized credit to nonviable firms—has a disinflationary effect. By keeping these firms afloat, zombie credit creates excess aggregate supply, thereby putting downward pressure on prices. Granular European data on inflation, firms, and banks confirm this mechanism. Markets affected by a rise in zombie credit experience lower firm entry and exit, capacity utilization, markups, and inflation, as well as a misallocation of capital and labor, which results in lower productivity, investment, and value added. If weakly capitalized banks were recapitalized in 2009, inflation in Europe would have been up to 0.21 percentage points higher post‐2012.