Substantial evidence suggests that regulatory agencies in the United States can be captured by the politicians who oversee them. We provide novel evidence of a federal agency in which capture is limited: the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Although patent applications from politically connected applicants are slightly more likely to be approved despite being of lower ex post quality, additional analyses suggest these outcomes are not indicative of capture. In particular, the disclosure quality of connected patents' legal claims increases more than unconnected patents during the review process, narrowing the scope of the patents and constraining the intellectual property rights. Furthermore, connected patents are no more likely than others to be litigated ex post, suggesting these patent grants are not spurious. Our findings provide insights into how the design of a regulator can limit the benefits that accrue to politically connected firms.

We present the first comprehensive descriptive evidence on the labor market and personal consequences for audit professionals in the United States who are named in SEC or PCAOB enforcement actions. Three key findings emerge. First, between 38% and 73% of culpable auditors depart from their firms within one year after the enforcement event. These departure rates are three to four times higher compared with a sample of non‐culpable auditors. Second, 83% of culpable auditors departing from Big 4 accounting firms exit the profession, compared with 58% of a departing non‐culpable comparison group. In contrast, about 77% of the culpable auditors leaving non–Big 4 accounting firms remain in public accounting, compared with 51% of a departing non‐culpable comparison group. Third, using novel data on personal real estate holdings, we find that culpable auditors do not appear to engage in markedly different transactions around enforcement compared with a comparison sample of non‐culpable individuals.