Michael Angus Walker, A Long-Term Econometric Model of the Canadian Economy with Emphasis on the Financial Sector: A Simulation Study of Some Alternative Policy Rules, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Sep., 1972), pp. 956-957

Dileep R. Mehta, Edward A. Moses, Benoit Deschamps, Michael C. Walker, The Influence of Dividends, Growth, and Leverage on Share Prices in the Electric Utility Industry: An Econometric Study, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 5 (Dec., 1980), pp. 1163-1196

Although several researchers have speculated that stock splits may affect the ownership structure of firms, there is very little empirical evidence available in this regard. We investigate a broad sample of stock splits by firms without confounding events, controlling for industry and size effects. Our results show that stock splits increase the numbers of both individual and institutional shareholders, and they do not affect the proportion of equity held by institutions. Further, changes in the numbers of individual and institutional shareholders are positively related to the split factor. Abnormal announcement returns are positively correlated with changes in the total number of shareholders. These findings support the signaling hypothesis.

We study the effects of intensifying competition for contracts in the context of US Defense procurement. Leveraging a discontinuous regulation that mandates agencies to publicize certain contract opportunities, we document that expanding the set of bidders reduces award prices but deteriorates post-award performance in terms of cost overruns and delays. We develop and estimate an auction model with endogenous entry and stochastic execution performance, in which the buyer endogenously chooses the intensity of competition. Model estimates indicate substantial heterogeneity in performance across contractors and show that simple adjustments to the current regulation could provide significant savings in procurement spending. (JEL D22, D24, D44, D82, D86, H56, H57)