In this paper we study systemic risk for the US and Europe. We show that banks’ exposures to common risk factors are crucial for systemic risk. We come to this conclusion by first showing that relations between US and European banks are smaller than within each region. We then show that European banks react more strongly to the onset of the financial crisis than US banks. Regarding the consequences of systemic risk, we show that dependence between the banking sector and a wide range of real sectors is limited. Our results imply that regulators and supervisors should address international bank dependencies arising from common risk factors, while recessions in real sectors due to bank defaults should be a secondary concern.

We show that fund families allocate their most skilled managers to market segments in which manager skill is rewarded best. In efficient markets, even skilled managers cannot generate excess returns. In less efficient markets, skilled managers can exploit inefficiencies and generate higher performance than unskilled managers. Fund families seem to be aware of the relation between skill, efficiency, and performance, and allocate more skilled managers to inefficient markets. They pursue this strategy when hiring new fund managers and when reassigning managers to funds within the family. Overall, we conclude that fund families allocate fund managers in an efficient way.

We examine the dynamics of bond correlation using a broad sample of US corporate bonds, and document that bond correlation varies heavily over time. We attribute this variation in bond correlation to variation in risk factor correlation reflecting time-varying flight-to-quality behavior of investors. We show that risk factor correlation increases when investor sentiment worsens, i.e., corporate bond investors exhibit stronger flight-to-quality when their sentiment is bad. Thus, bad investor sentiment leads to flight-to-quality behavior and, ultimately, high bond correlation. Very good sentiment, in contrast, can cause risk factor correlation and bond correlation to be negative.

Based on individual CDS transactions cleared by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, we show that illiquidity strongly affects credit default swap premiums. We identify the following effects: first, transaction direction affects prices, as buy (sell) orders lead to premium increases (decreases). Second, larger transactions have a higher price impact. This finding stands in stark contrast to corporate bond markets. Third, traders charge higher premiums as a price for liquidity provision, not as compensation for asymmetric information. Fourth, buy-side investors pay significantly higher prices than dealers for demanding liquidity. Finally, inventory risk seems to matter little in explaining liquidity premiums.

We analyze the impact of market frictions on the trading volume and liquidity premia of finite-maturity assets when investors differ in their trading needs. Our equilibrium model generates a clientele effect (frequently trading investors hold only short-term assets) and predicts i) a hump-shaped relation between trading volume and maturity, ii) lower trading volumes of older compared with younger assets, iii) an increasing liquidity term structure from ask prices, iv) a decreasing or U-shaped liquidity term structure from bid prices, and v) spillovers of liquidity from short-term to long-term maturities. Empirical tests for U.S. corporate bonds support our theoretical predictions.

Human capital acquired while working in other industries before joining fund management provides fund managers with an information advantage. Fund managers exploit this advantage by overweighting their experience industries and by picking outperforming stocks from these industries. These managers’ superior information is impounded into stock prices slowly, suggesting that their information is unique and takes a while to be discovered by the markets. Families exploit their manager’s industry-specific human capital by broadly employing their investment ideas in other funds. The investment value of industry experience is unaffected by whether or not the manager with such experience is in a team. Received August 25, 2016; editorial decision December 24, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.