We find that a firm's dividend yield has a positive impact on its common stock return that is decreasing in the level of institutional and corporate ownership, our indicator of whether the marginal investor in a firm's common stock is more likely to be a low-tax or a high-tax investor. These results suggest that (1) a dividend tax penalty is incorporated into the return on a firm's common stock and (2) both a firm's dividend policy and its ownership structure impact the size of the dividend tax penalty.

We examine the associations among leverage, corporate and investor level taxes, and the firm's implied cost of equity capital. Expanding on Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963], the cost of equity capital can be expressed as a function of leverage and corporate and investor level taxes. Based on this expression, we predict that the cost of equity is increasing in leverage, and that corporate taxes mitigate this leverage-related risk premium, while the personal tax disadvantage of debt increases this premium. We empirically test these predictions using implied cost of equity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Our results suggest that the equity risk premium associated with leverage is decreasing in the corporate tax benefit from debt. We find some evidence that the equity risk premium from leverage is increasing in the personal tax penalty associated with debt.

ABSTRACT We propose that ex‐dividend day excess volume is motivated by tax heterogeneity among investors, and thus is increasing in investor tax heterogeneity. Institutional ownership is our measure of heterogeneity. Since investor heterogeneity is a concave function of institutional ownership, we hypothesize that ex‐day volume is a concave function of institutional ownership. Cross‐sectional tests support the tax‐motivated trading hypothesis. Additional tests, using trade size and pension ownership as proxies for institutional trades, yield similar results. We contribute to the literature by considering the interaction between payout policy and ownership structure in explaining the cross‐sectional variation in ex‐day volume.

Utama and Cready [Utama, S., Cready, W.M., 1997. Institutional ownership, differential predisclosure precision and trading volume at announcement dates. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 129–150] use total institutional ownership to proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders, an important determinant of trading around earnings announcements. We argue that institutions holding small stakes cannot justify the fixed cost of developing private predisclosure information. Also, institutions with large stakes generally do not trade around earnings announcements since they are dedicated investors or face regulations that make informed trading difficult. However, institutions holding medium stakes have incentives to develop private predisclosure information and trade on it; we show that their ownership is a finer proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders at earnings announcements.

The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 reduced shareholder-level taxes on equity income. If shareholder-level taxation is a component of cost of equity capital, then the cost of equity capital should decrease after the Tax Act. We find that the cost of equity capital decreases by 1.02% and that the decline is smaller for firms largely held by institutional investors to whom the tax rate reduction does not apply. These results suggest that the Tax Act lowered the cost of equity capital and add further evidence to the question of whether taxes impact valuation.

ABSTRACT We estimate firm‐level implied cost of equity capital based on recent advances in accounting and finance research and examine the effect of dividend taxes on the cost of equity capital. We investigate whether dividend taxes affect firms' cost of capital by testing the relation between the implied cost of equity capital and a measure of the tax‐penalized portion of dividend yield, which we define as the product of dividend yield and the dividend tax penalty. The results generally support the dividend tax capitalization hypothesis. We find a positive relation between the implied cost of equity capital and the tax‐penalized portion of dividend yield that is decreasing in aggregate institutional ownership, our proxy for tax‐advantaged investors. The evidence in this study adds to the understanding of the effect of investor‐level taxes on equity value.

We examine the impact of managerial ability on the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends. We find that managerial ability increases the sensitivity of dividends to the dividend tax penalty. In addition, the positive association between managerial ability and the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends decreases in institutional ownership. Further, managerial ability increases the shareholder tax sensitivity of the substitution of dividends with share repurchases. Finally, evidence from tax reforms reveals that high ability managers are more responsive to a reduction in dividend tax penalty than to an increase. We conclude that managerial ability influences the formation of tax-efficient dividend policies.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether and how shareholder‐level taxes affect earnings response coefficients (ERCs). Our tests indicate that when the tax rate on dividends increases, ERCs decrease for firms with high levels of dividend yield and whose marginal investor is likely to be an individual. For firms with high levels of share repurchase yield and whose marginal investor is likely to be an individual, an increase in dividend tax rate has no discernible effect on ERCs. These results are consistent with the notion that the tax penalty on dividends, relative to capital gains, reduces the earnings‐return relation.