[The procedure for opening stocks on the NYSE appears to affect price volatility. An analytical framework for assessing the magnitude of the structurally induced volatility is presented. The ratio of variance of open-to-open returns to close-to-close returns is shown to be consistently greater than one for NYSE common stocks during the period 1982 through 1986. The greater volatility at the open is not attributable to the way in which public information is released since both the open-to-open return and the close-to-close returns span the same period of time. Instead, the greater volatility appears to be attributable to private information revealed in trading and to temporary price deviations induced by specialist and other traders. The implied cost of immediacy at the open is significantly higher than at the close. Other empirical evidence in this article documents the volume of trading at the open, the time delays between the exchange opening and the first transaction in a stock, the difference in daytime volatility versus overnight volatility, and the extent to which volatility is related to trading volume.]

Wildcard options are embedded in many derivative contracts. They arise when the settlement price of the contract is established before the time at which the wildcard option holder must declare his intention to make or accept delivery and the exercise of the wildcard option closes out the underlying asset position. This paper provides a simple method for valuing wildcard options and illustrates the technique by valuing the sequence of wildcard options embedded in the S&P 100 index option contract. The results show that wildcard options can account for an economically significant fraction of S&P 100 index option value.

This paper examines the pricing performance of the valuation equation for American call options on stocks with known dividends and compares it with two suggested approximation methods. The approximation obtained by substituting the stock price net of the present value of the escrowed dividends into the Black-Scholes model is shown to induce spurious correlation between prediction error and (1) the standard deviation of stock return, (2) the degree to which the option is in-the-money or out-of-the-money, (3) the probability of early exercise, (4) the time to expiration of the option, and (5) the dividend yield of the stock. A new method of examining option market efficiency is developed and tested.

Both the Roll and the Geske equations for the valuation of the American call option on a stock with known dividends are incorrectly specified. This note presents the corrected valuation formula, explains the misspecifications and provides a numerical example.

This study analyzes the effects of changes in S&P 500 index composition from January 1986 through June 1994, a period during which Standard and Poor's began its practice of preannouncing changes five days beforehand. The new announcement practice has given rise to the 'S&P game' and has altered the way stock prices react. The authors find that prices increase abnormally from the close on the announcement day to the close on the effective day. The overall increase is greater than under the old announcement policy, although part of the increase reverses after the stock is included in the index.

The authors provide new evidence regarding the degree of integration among markets for stocks, futures, and options prior to and during the October 1987 market crash. Where previous analyses have resulted in recommendations for the implementation of circuit breakers, the coordination of margin requirements across markets, and changes in regulatory jurisdiction, their analysis indicates that delinkage between markets during the crash was primarily caused by an antiquated mechanism for processing stock-market orders. The results suggest that market integration may be better served by efficient order execution than by further restricting markets.

Using transaction data on the S&P 100 index options, the authors study the effect of valuation simplifications that are commonplace in previous research on the time-series properties of implied market volatility. Using an American-style algorithm that accounts for the discrete nature of the dividends on the S&P 100 index, they find that spurious negative serial correlation in implied volatility changes is induced by nonsimultaneously observing the option price and the index level. Negative serial correlation is also induced by a bid/ask price effect if a single option is used to estimate implied volatility. In addition, the authors find that these same effects induce spurious (and unreasonable) negative cross-correlations between the changes in call and put implied volatility.

This study investigates intraday relations between price changes and trading volumes of options and stocks for a sample of firms whose options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange during the first quarter of 1986. After purging the price change series of the effects of bid/ask spreads, multivariate time-series analysis is used to estimate the lead/lag relation between the price changes in the option and stock markets. The results indicate that price changes in the stock market lead the option market by as much as fifteen minutes. The analysis of trading volume indicates that the stock market lead may be even longer.

This study tests Chicago Board Options Exchange efficiency by examining option price behavior in the weeks surrounding a firm's quarterly earnings announcement. The evidence presented here suggests that a first-order autoregressive seasonal process describes quarterly earnings behavior and demonstrates that the information content of an earnings announcement is fully incorporated in option prices by the end of the announcement week.

Derman and Kani (1994), Dupire (1994), and Rubinstein (1994) hypothesize that asset return volatility is a deterministic function of asset price and time, and develop a deterministic volatility function (DVF) option valuation model that has the potential of fitting the observed cross section of option prices exactly. Using S&P 500 options from June 1988 through December 1993, we examine the predictive and hedging performance of the DVF option valuation model and find it is no better than an ad hoc procedure that merely smooths Black–Scholes (1973) implied volatilities across exercise prices and times to expiration.