We provide estimates of holdings of highly rated securitization tranches of U.S. bank holding companies before the credit crisis and evaluate hypotheses that have been advanced to explain them. Whereas holdings exceeded Tier 1 capital for some large banks, they were economically trivial for the typical bank. Banks with high holdings were not riskier before the crisis using conventional measures, but they performed poorly during the crisis. We find that holdings of highly rated tranches were correlated with a bank's securitization activity. Theories unrelated to the securitization activity, such as "bad incentives" or "bad risk management," are not supported in the data.

This paper investigates the relationship between securitization activity and the extension of subprime credit. The analysis is motivated by two sets of compelling empirical facts. First, the origination of subprime mortgages exploded between the years 2003 and 2005. Second, the securitization of subprime loans increased substantially over the same time period, driven primarily by the five largest independent broker/dealer investment banks. We argue that the relative shift in the securitization activity of investment banks was driven by forces exogenous to factors impacting lending decisions in the primary mortgage market and resulted in lower ZIP code denial rates, higher subprime origination rates, and higher subsequent default rates. Consistent with recent findings in the literature, we provide evidence that the increased securitization activity of investment banks reduced lenders' incentives to carefully screen borrowers.

This paper investigates whether the securitization of corporate bank loan facilities had an impact on the price of corporate debt. Our results suggest that loan facilities that are subsequently securitized are associated with a 17 basis point lower spread than that of facilities that are not subsequently securitized. We consider facility characteristics that are associated with the likelihood of securitization and estimate the extent to which these characteristics are related to spreads. We document that Term Loan B facilities, facilities of B-rated firms, and facilities originated by banks that originate CLOs are securitized more frequently than other facilities. Spreads on facilities estimated to be more likely to be subsequently securitized have lower spreads than otherwise similar facilities. The results are consistent with the view that securitization caused a reduction in the cost of capital.

We study intermediation in the housing market. Using data from an online platform utilized by real estate agents to generate leads, we identify exogenous intermediary attention arising from the quasi-randomized ordering of potential listings. Greater intermediary attention leads to an increased probability of listing with an agent and selling quickly, and a higher transaction price. The listing and transaction probabilities of neighboring properties decrease in intermediary attention. These results contrast sharply with endogenous correlations and provide causal evidence that intermediaries resolve property-level frictions deriving from search, information, or behavioral considerations but do not mitigate neighborhood-level information asymmetries.

We show that search frictions in credit markets affect accepted interest rates and loan sizes and distort consumption. Using data on car loan applications and originations not intermediated by car dealers, we isolate quasi-exogenous variation in both the costs and benefits to searching for credit. After identifying lender-specific policies that price risk discontinuously, we study the differential response to offered interest rates by borrowers who face high and low search costs. High-search-cost borrowers are 10% more likely to accept loan offers with higher markups, consequently originating smaller loans and purchasing older and less expensive cars than lower-search-cost borrowers. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

When students fund their education through loans, changes in student borrowing and tuition are interlinked. Higher tuition costs raise loan demand, but loan supply also affects equilibrium tuition costs - for example, by relaxing students' funding constraints. To resolve this simultaneity problem, we exploit detailed student-level financial data and changes in federal student aid programs to identify the impact of increased student loan funding on tuition. We find that institutions more exposed to changes in the subsidized federal loan program increased their tuition disproportionately around these policy changes, with a sizable pass-through effect on tuition of about 65 percent. We also find that Pell Grant aid and the unsubsidized federal loan program have pass-through effects on tuition, although these are economically and statistically not as strong. The subsidized loan effect on tuition is most pronounced for expensive, private institutions that are somewhat, but not among the most, selective.

We document three phenomena we jointly refer to as monthly payment targeting. First, using data from 500,000 used auto loans and discontinuities in contract terms offered by hundreds of lenders, we show that demand is more sensitive to maturity than to interest rate, consistent with consumers managing payment size when making debt decisions. Second, many consumers appear to employ segregated mental accounts, spending exogenous payment savings on larger loans. Third, consumers bunch at round number monthly payment amounts, consistent with heuristic budgeting. That these patterns hold in subsamples of likely constrained and unconstrained borrowers challenges liquidity constraints as a complete explanation.

This paper uses proprietary data from a leading intermediary to explain the magnitude and determinants of transaction costs in the secondary market for private equity stakes. Most transactions occur at a discount to net asset value. Buyers average an annualized public market equivalent of 1.023 compared with 0.976 for sellers, implying that buyers outperform sellers by a market-adjusted 5 percentage points annually. Both the cross-sectional pattern of transaction costs and the identity of sellers and buyers suggest that the market is one in which relatively flexible buyers earn returns by supplying liquidity to investors wishing to exit.

We provide estimates of holdings of highly rated securitization tranches of U.S. bank holding companies before the credit crisis and evaluate hypotheses that have been advanced to explain them. Whereas holdings exceeded Tier 1 capital for some large banks, they were economically trivial for the typical bank. Banks with high holdings were not riskier before the crisis using conventional measures, but they performed poorly during the crisis. We find that holdings of highly rated tranches were correlated with a bank’s securitization activity. Theories unrelated to the securitization activity, such as “bad incentives ” or “bad risk management, ” are not supported in the data. (JEL G01, G21) Holdings of highly rated tranches of securitizations held by U.S. banks were at the heart of the financial crisis of 2007–2008. At least in the early phases of the crisis, the bulk of the assets that were considered to have become toxic by many observers were these securities with subprime and alt-A mortgage collateral. Losses in value led banks to have low capital and forced them to raise more capital, cut back on new loans, and engage in fire sales (see Brunnermeier 2009). The most visible and controversial policy initiative of the U.S. Treasury

ABSTRACT Measures of private equity (PE) performance based on cash flows do not account for a discount‐rate risk premium that is a component of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) alpha. We create secondary market PE indices and find that PE discount rates vary considerably. Net asset values are too smooth because they fail to reflect variation in discount rates. Although the CAPM alpha for our index is zero, the generalized public market equivalent based on cash flows is large and positive. We obtain similar results for a set of synthetic funds that invest in small cap stocks. Ignoring variation in PE discount rates can lead to a misallocation of capital.