This paper contributes three extensions of Cochrane's work on measuring the relative stability of long-term growth. It estimates variance ratios for nine OECD countries over the period 1871-1985, presents an improved approximation to the distribution of the variance ratio, and considers the comovements of long growth cycles across countries. The evidence indicates that the relative stability of long-term growth found by Cochrane is unique to the United States. Relative to the United States, most countries have more variable dynamics at low frequencies and smoother dynamics at frequencies traditionally associated with business cycles.

This paper contributes three extensions of Cochrane's work on measuring the relative stability of long-term growth. It estimates variance ratios for nine OECD countries over the period 1871-1985, presents an improved approximation to the distribution of the variance ratio, and considers the comovements of long growth cycles across countries. The evidence indicates that the relative stability of long-term growth found by Cochrane is unique to the United States. Relative to the United States, most countries have more variable dynamics at low frequencies and smoother dynamics at frequencies traditionally associated with business cycles.

Abstract We study the effects of parameter uncertainty prompted by structural breaks. In our model, agents respond differently to uncertainty prompted by regime shifts in shock processes than they react to comparable perceived increases in shock volatility. The magnitude of the response to an increase in uncertainty about TFP associated with a structural break is greater than that of a response to a comparable perceived rise in volatility. This is because lifetime utility varies more when shocks shift beliefs and perceived wealth.

Purely forward-looking versions of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) generate too little inflation persistence. Some authors add ad hoc backward-looking terms to address this shortcoming. We hypothesize that inflation persistence results mainly from variation in the long-run trend component of inflation, which we attribute to shifts in monetary policy. We derive a version of the NKPC that incorporates a time-varying inflation trend and examine whether it explains the dynamics of inflation. When drift in trend inflation is taken into account, a purely forward-looking version of the model fits the data well, and there is no need for backward-looking components. (JEL E12, E31, E52)

The time-series literature reports two stylized facts about output dynamics in the United States: GNP growth is positively autocorrelated, and GNP appears to have an important trend-reverting component. This paper investigates whether current real-business-cycle (RBC) models are consistent with these stylized facts. Many RBC models have weak internal propagation mechanisms and must rely on external sources of dynamics to replicate both facts. Models that incorporate labor adjustment costs are partially successful. They endogenously generate positive autocorrelation in output growth, but they need implausibly large transitory shocks to match the trend-reverting component in output.

The time-series literature reports two stylized facts about output dynamics in the United States: GNP growth is positively autocorrelated, and GNP appears to have an important trend-reverting component. This paper investigates whether current real-business-cycle (RBC) models are consistent with these stylized facts. Many RBC models have weak internal propagation mechanisms and must rely on external sources of dynamics to replicate both facts. Models that incorporate labor adjustment costs are partially successful. They endogenously generate positive autocorrelation in output growth, but they need implausibly large transitory shocks to match the trend-reverting component in output.

We measure price-level uncertainty and instability in the United States over the period 1850 to 2012. Major outbreaks of price-level uncertainty and instability occur both before and after World War II, alternating with three price-level moderations: one near the turn of the twentieth century, another under Bretton Woods, and a third in the 1990s. There is no evidence that the price level was systematically more stable or less uncertain before or after World War II. Moderations sometimes involved links to gold, but the experience of the 1990s proves that a well-managed fiat regime can achieve the same outcome.

We compare market prices of risk in economies with identical patterns of endowments, priors, and information flows, but two different market structures, one with complete markets, another in which consumers can trade only a single risk-free bond. We study how opportunities to speculate, uncommon priors, and learning affect market prices of risk. Two types of consumers have diverse beliefs about the law of motion for a random exogenous endowment. One type knows the true law of motion while the other type learns about it via Bayes' theorem. Less-well-informed consumers are pessimistic, initially overestimating the probability of a catastrophic state. Learning dynamics and the wealth dynamics that they drive contribute to differences in evolutions of market prices of risk across market structures.