This paper investigates the existence and extent of economies of scale in the European payment processing industry. It is expected that the creation of a single European payments area (SEPA) will spur consolidations and mergers among European payment processors to more fully realize payment economies of scale. We find evidence for the existence of significant economies of scale using data of eight European payment processors during the years 1990–2005. The analysis also reveals that ownership structure is an important factor to explain cost differences across European processing centers.

Based on frontier analysis, we derive inferences of bank consumer loan competition from estimating a revenue-cost ‘competition efficiency’ (CE) frontier. The competitiveness of the $400 billion U.S. bank consumer loan market is then assessed by comparing results from our frontier CE measure with other competition measures, such as HHI, Lerner Index, and H-Statistic. These measures are weakly related to one another and only half of them identify banks with the highest loan price as also being the least competitive. This is the opposite of what is expected. Using the frontier CE measure, the most and least competitive banks are not located in the most populous states and the largest banks are underrepresented. Overall, the HHI should not be used to indicate competition.

There are numerous ways to indicate the degree of banking competition across countries. Antitrust authorities rely on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm while academics prefer price mark-ups (Lerner index) or correlations of input costs with output prices (H-statistic). These measures are not always strongly correlated within or across countries. Frontier efficiency analysis is used to devise an alternative indicator of competition and rank European countries by their dispersion from a “competition frontier”. The frontier is determined by how well payment and other costs explain variations in loan-deposit rate spread and non-interest activity revenues. Overall, differences in competition appear to be small.

In card payment systems, no-surcharge rules prohibit merchants from charging consumers extra for card payments. However, such rules are prohibited in the Netherlands. Dutch retailers are allowed to surcharge consumers for debit card use. This setting permits an empirical analysis of the impact of surcharging card payments on merchant acceptance and consumer payment choice. Based on consumer and retailer survey data, our analysis shows that surcharging steers consumers away from using debit cards towards cash. Half of the observed difference in debit card payment shares across retailers can be explained by this surcharge effect. Removing debit card surcharges may induce cost savings of more than EUR 50 million in the long run.

This paper contributes to the literature on the relation between bank profitability and economic activity. When allowing for stronger co-movement of bank profit with economic activity during deep recessions, we find a much larger impact of output growth on bank profitability than commonly found in the literature. Among the different components of bank profit, loan losses are the main driver of this result. We also find long-term interest rates in previous years to be important determinants of bank profit in times of high economic growth. Our findings are robust to the use of aggregate or individual bank data.

COVID-19 has temporarily changed the relative costs and benefits of different payment methods: cash has become more costly in terms of health risks, ease of use and likelihood of acceptance, whereas debit card usage has become less costly. As a result, consumers have shifted away from cash. Based on unique daily payment diary survey data collected between January 2018 and December 2021 amongst a representative panel of Dutch consumers, we study the shift in payment behaviour and payment preferences during two lockdown periods in the Netherlands in 2020 and 2021. Since the start of the first lockdown the likelihood of debit card usage at the expense of cash has increased by 12 percentage points compared to its trend level. About 60 percent of this shift on top of the autonomous trend persisted several months after the end of the first lockdown and part of it has persisted several months after the end of the second lockdown. The results indicate that the pandemic accelerated the increased usage of debit card at the POS, especially during the first pandemic year. Also, the pandemic has resulted in a shift in payment preferences towards more contactless payments. Both effects are largest for elderly people.

Central banks can operate with negative equity, and many have done so in history without undermining trust in fiat money. However, there are limits. How negative can central bank equity be before fiat money loses credibility? We address this question using a global game approach motivated by the fall of the Bank of Amsterdam (1609–1820). We solve for the unique break point where negative equity and asset illiquidity render fiat money worthless. We draw lessons on the role of fiscal support and central bank capital in sustaining trust in fiat money.