Abstract We use a mean-variance approach to address the classic puzzle of British capital export in the 19th century. Our analysis shows that foreign securities listed in London offered significant diversification benefits to British investors. In simple terms, international diversification reduced risk. Conservative estimates of the optimal investment portfolio for a domestic investor suggest that the balance between foreign and domestic security offerings on the London Exchange was close to what classic equilibrium models of asset prices would suggest.

Some of the leading theories of momentum have different empirical predictions that depend on market composition and structure. The institutional theory predicts lower momentum profits in markets with less agency. Behavioral theories predict lower profits in markets with more sophisticated investors. In this paper, we use a dataset from a major 19th century equity market to test these predictions. We find no evidence to support the institutional theory due to the lack of delegated management. We exploit a regulatory change in the middle of our sample period to test behavioral theories. We find evidence consistent with overreaction theories of momentum.

Long‐term estimates of expected return on equities are typically derived from U.S. data only. There are reasons to suspect that these estimates are subject to survivorship, as the United States is arguably the most successful capitalist system in the world. We collect a database of capital appreciation indexes for 39 markets going back to the 1920s. For 1921 to 1996, U.S. equities had the highest real return of all countries, at 4.3 percent, versus a median of 0.8 percent for other countries. The high equity premium obtained for U.S. equities appears to be the exception rather than the rule.

This paper reexamines the ability of dividend yields to predict long-horizon stock returns. The authors use the bootstrap methodology, as well as simulations, to examine the distribution of test statistics under the null hypothesis of no forecasting ability. These experiments are constructed so as to maintain the dynamics of regressions with lagged dependent variables over long horizons. They find that the empirically observed statistics are well within the 95 percent bounds of their simulated distributions. Overall there is no strong statistical evidence indicating that dividend yields can be used to forecast stock returns.

Abstract This study shows that U.S. individual investors hold under-diversified portfolios, where the level of under-diversification is greater among younger, low-income, less-educated, and less-sophisticated investors. The level of under-diversification is also correlated with investment choices that are consistent with over-confidence, trend-following behavior, and local bias. Furthermore, investors who over-weight stocks with higher volatility and higher skewness are less diversified. In contrast, there is little evidence that portfolio size or transaction costs constrains diversification. Under-diversification is costly to most investors, but a small subset of investors under-diversify because of superior information.

This paper addresses the bias associated with parametric measurement of timing skill based on monthly timer returns when timers can make daily timing decisions. Simulations suggest that the classic Henriksson-Merton parametric measure of timing skill is weak and biased downward when applied to the monthly returns of a daily timer. The paper proposes an adjustment that mitigates this problem without the need to collect daily timer returns. Four tests of timing skill, carried out on a sample of 558 mutual funds, show that very few funds exhibit statistically significant timing skill. More encompassing, the adjusted-FF3 test (based on the specification that incorporates both the proposed adjustment and the Fama-French three-factor model) is the least biased measure of timing skill among the four—it provides for a sharper inference regarding timing skill and helps mitigate biases associated with the choice of investment style.

The authors explore performance persistence in mutual funds using absolute and relative benchmarks. Their sample, largely free of survivorship bias, indicates that relative risk-adjusted performance of mutual funds persists; however, persistence is mostly due to funds that lag the S&P 500. A profit analysis indicates that poor performance increases the probability of disappearance. A year-by-year decomposition of the persistence effect demonstrates that the relative performance pattern depends upon the time period observed and it is correlated across managers. Consequently, it is due to a common strategy that is not captured by standard stylistic categories or risk adjustment procedures.