Abstract We study how involving employee board representatives in determining managerial compensation affects the within-firm pay ratio. The 2009 German Compensation Act shifted executive pay decisions to the entire supervisory board, amplifying employees’ influence at firms with parity employee representation. This reform resulted in increased manager-to-worker pay ratios, driven by higher managerial compensation, without corresponding changes in firm performance or manager turnover. The result is robust in matched samples and absent in falsification tests. Improved employee job security and weak wage increases point to a possible alliance between employees and managers, indicating shared governance may not necessarily reduce pay inequality.

Abstract We examine the role of factor models and simple performance heuristics in investor decision-making using Morningstar’s 2002 rating methodology change. Before the change, flows strongly correlated with CAPM alphas. After, when funds are ranked by size and book-to-market groups, flows become more sensitive to 3-factor alphas (FF3). Flows to a matched institutional sample (same managers/strategies) follow FF3 before and after the change but are unrelated to the CAPM. Placebo tests with sector funds and other factor loadings show no effects. Our results imply that improvements in simple performance heuristics can result in more sophisticated risk adjustment by retail investors.

ABSTRACT Target date funds (TDFs) are designed to provide unsophisticated or inattentive investors with age‐appropriate exposures to different asset classes like stocks and bonds. The rise of TDFs has moved a significant share of retirement investors into macrocontrarian strategies that sell stocks after relatively good stock market performance. This rebalancing drives contrarian flows across equity mutual funds held by TDFs, stabilizing their funding, and reduces stock returns for stocks disproportionately held by these funds when stock market returns are relatively high. Continued growth in TDFs and similar investment products may dampen stock market volatility and increase the transmission of shocks across asset classes.

Using a panel of self-declared benchmarks, we examine funds’ use of mismatched benchmarks over time. Mismatching is high at the beginning of our sample (45 % of TNA in 2008), consistent with prior studies, but declines significantly over time (27 % in 2020), driven by existing specialized funds changing benchmarks to match their style. Market forces including investor learning, institutional governance, market competition, and product positioning all play a role in benchmark correction decisions. For funds with difficult to categorize investment strategies, mismatched benchmarks are less associated with performance bias. Our study highlights the value of market solutions in aligning manager-investor interests.