This paper studies the use of cash and credit for making transactions when there is asymmetric information in credit markets. For relatively low inflation rates, equilibria are of the pooling variety and low-credit-risk consumers signal their riskiness to lenders only indirectly by establishing a good track record in credit markets. For higher inflation rates there may exist a separating equilibrium in which low-credit-risk consumers directly signal their type to lenders by specializing in cash early in life and specializing in credit later in life. The greater the degree of adverse selection in credit markets, the wider the range of inflation rates for which a separating equilibrium exists. Credit usage is increasing in the inflation rate, but greater adverse selection may increase or decrease credit usage depending on the parameterization. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: E44.

This study provides empirical evidence regarding the effect of annual accounting earnings announcements on investors' trading behavior. We find that the magnitude of trading volume reaction is an increasing function of both the magnitude of the associated price reaction and the level of predisclosure information asymmetry. These results are consistent with Kim and Verrecchia's (1991a) theoretical trading volume proposition.

Sellers who extend trade credit to their business customers choose whether to integrate the management of trade credit or to enter into specialized factoring contracts. Using original data from a broad cross-section of firms we test a model of this decision. The model is based on a theory of the firm that stresses transactions costs (including information costs) as determinants of vertical integration. Consistent with expectations, we find that specificity of assets to the buyer-seller relationship is negatively related to the decision to factor and that factors are more likely to be used when information and monitoring costs are high.

IT IS OFrEN THE CASE that an individual's decision is at least partly based on information received from another. And when the agents' payoffs depend on both the former's decision and on the latter's information, there is an incentive for the individual to attempt to bias the decision maker's decision in his or her favor by strategically manipulating the information transmitted. In a seminal paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) (hereafter, C/S) study such strategic information transmission in the context of an abstract sender/receiver game. Variants of the Crawford and Sobel model have been applied widely, and as the application varies so often does the interpretation of type. In some cases, type refers to a preference parameter given by Nature-as, for example, in bargaining theory (e.g., Farrell and Gibbons (1989), Matthews (1989)), whereas in other settings-for instance, legislative decision making or expert testimony -type refers to more or less technical information concerning how decisions map into final consequences and, as such, is acquired information (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Milgrom and Roberts (1986)). When the information has to be acquired, it is natural to suppose the acquisition is costly; for otherwise, there is no reason why such information is asymmetrically distributed. So long as the receiver can observe surely-or, at least, accurately infer-whether the sender is informed, and so long as messages are cheap-talk, there is no issue here for strategic information transmission (save whether to become at all). However, there are many circumstances when it is inappropri- ate to assume the receiver has such knowledge. One possibility is that a receiver may know that a sender has some relevant informa- tion, but be uncertain of the quality of this information. A second, perhaps more important, possibility is that a receiver is unable to tell whether a (potential) sender is uninformed. Inter alia, this problem constitutes the rationale for of the law being inadmissible as a legal defense (were it admissible, then informed miscreants would mimic uninformed transgressors); leads voters to be skeptical of politicians claiming ignorance of illegal arms deals; and makes the SEC sensitive to problems in distinguishing insider trading from legitimate good judgement. So there is an intrinsic asymmetry in that it is generally possible for, say, senders to verify possession of at least some information, but it is typically prohibitively difficult to verify any lack of knowledge

[We show that the positive volatility-volume relation documented by numerous researchers actually reflects the positive relation between volatility and the number of transactions. Thus, it is the occurrence of transactions per se, and not their size, that generates volatility; trade size has no information beyond that contained in the frequency of transactions. Our results suggest that theoretical research needs to entertain scenarios in which (i) both the frequency and size of trades are endogenously determined, yet (ii) the size of trades has no information content beyond that contained in the number of transactions.]

Linear and nonlinear Granger causality tests are used to examine the dynamic relation between daily Dow Jones stock returns and percentage changes in New York Stock Exchange trading volume. The authors find evidence of significant bidirectional nonlinear causality between returns and volume. They also examine whether the nonlinear causality from volume to returns can be explained by volume serving as a proxy for information flow in the stochastic process generating stock return variance as suggested by P. Clark's (1973) latent common-factor model. After controlling for volatility persistence in returns, the authors continue to find evidence of nonlinear causality from volume to returns.

Linear and nonlinear Granger causality tests are used to examine the dynamic relation between daily Dow Jones stock returns and percentage changes in New York Stock Exchange trading volume. We find evidence of significant bidirectional nonlinear causality between returns and volume. We also examine whether the nonlinear causality from volume to returns can be explained by volume serving as a proxy for information flow in the stochastic process generating stock return variance as suggested by Clark's (1973) latent common‐factor model. After controlling for volatility persistence in returns, we continue to find evidence of nonlinear causality from volume to returns.

We present evidence that 20 percent of the 10-Ks in our sample are filed with the SEC after the 90-day statutory due date. Firms that delay filing their 10-K are not a random sample of firms; up to 25 (10) percent of the firms experiencing unfavorable (favorable) economic events delay their 10-K. Firms that delay their 10-K are, on average, small, have negative accounting rates of return, negative earnings changes, low liquidity, and high financial leverage; they also experience negative market- adjusted stock returns.

This paper addresses the problem of testing financial models in the presence of market microstructure effects. The moment restrictions implied by the financial and market microstructure models are jointly tested using Hansen’s (1982) GMM approach. To illustrate the methodology, I consider the random walk model in combination with the bid-ask price effect model of Blume and Stambaugh (1983). Within this sufficiently simple framework, I obtain closed-form expressions for the estimators, standard errors of the estimators, and the test statistic, which affords an opportunity to examine the precision of the estimators and the power of the test as the return interval increases. I show that apparent rejections of the random walk model cannot be sustained when tests of the model are adjusted for market microstructure effects, and I discuss other applications of the methodology.