Using data for more than 200 banks from 21 OECD countries for the period 2002–2008, we examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risk using quantile regressions. In contrast to most previous research, we find that banking regulation and supervision has an effect on the risks of high-risk banks. However, most measures for bank regulation and supervision do not have a significant effect on low-risk banks. As banking risk and bank regulation and supervision are multi-faceted concepts, our measures for both concepts are constructed using factor analysis

By examining the impact of capital regulation on bank risk-taking using a local estimation technique, this paper attempts to quantify for the first time the heterogeneous response of banks towards this type of regulation in banking sectors of western-type economies. Subsequently, using this information, we examine the sources of heterogeneity. The findings suggest that the impact of capital regulation on bank risk is very heterogeneous across banks and the sources of this heterogeneity can be traced into both bank and industry characteristics, as well as into macroeconomic conditions. An important implication of the findings is that common capital regulatory umbrellas are not sufficient to promote financial stability, especially if they are not accompanied by supervisory effectiveness. On the basis of our findings, we contend that more focus should be placed on the actions needed to restrain excessive risk-taking of banks

This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis intervention policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set of banks from 66 countries around 79 banking crises. The results suggest that on average market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. This weakening is higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promoted market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodative approach is adopted to resolve it

We exploit a unique data set of executive turnovers in community banks to test the micro-mechanisms of discipline by examining the monitoring and influencing role of different stakeholders. We find executives are more likely to be dismissed in risky institutions. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. Examining the roles of shareholders, debtholders, and regulators as monitors, we obtain evidence for shareholder discipline. However, there is no evidence that risk affects dismissals more if debtholders have a larger stake in the bank or when regulators are aware of distress. When we analyze risk, losses, and profitability following turnovers, we obtain no evidence that replacing executives improves performance

Do foreign banks perform better than domestic banks? The existing literature has come up with different answers, in part as data coverage has varied and often been limited. Studying the performance of foreign relative to domestic banks in many countries between 1999 and 2006, we find that the answer importantly depends on a number of factors. Specifically, foreign banks tend to perform better when from a high income country and when regulation in the host country is relatively weak. They also perform better when larger and having a bigger market share. Foreign banks from home countries with the same language and similar regulation as the host country also perform better. Geographical closeness, however, does not improve performance. These findings show that it is important to control for heterogeneity among foreign banks when studying their performance and help reconcile some contradictory results found in the literature

We investigate how differences in regulation regarding banking-commerce integration and banking sector concentration influence loan spreads across 29 countries. Theoretical research posits conflicting effects based on agency costs, information asymmetry costs, and market power. Increased integration is associated with lower loan spreads in countries with low concentration, but moving to high levels of integration increases spreads in countries with high concentration. Starting from lower levels, an increase in integration is associated with an increase in informational efficiency that disappears at higher levels of integration. We also show that market concentration affects loan spreads differently under high-, medium-, and low-integration regimes

Using a new database, we document the determinants of involuntary consumer bank account closures. During 2001–2005, approximately 30 million debit accounts were involuntarily closed for excessive overdrafting. We focus on multiple factors to explain this phenomenon: household economics and financial decision-making ability, social capital, bank policies, and the alternative financial services sector. Involuntary closures are more frequent in US counties with a larger fraction of single mothers, lower education levels, lower wealth, and higher unemployment. Closures are higher in communities with high property crime rates and low electoral participation. Bank policies have an independent relation to closures, with counties having more competitive banking markets and more multi-market banks experiencing higher closure rates; bank structure also seems to affect the speed at which banks adjust their policies to changes in household income. Finally, using both national data and a state-level shift in regulation, we find evidence that access to payday lending leads to higher rates of involuntary account closure

This paper examines the tying of lending to investment banking business by universal banks. Tying may alleviate credit rationing by assuring the lender of an adequate share of the social surplus that its lending generates; however, tying raises the profitability of loans to troubled entrepreneurs, softening entrepreneurial budget constraints and reducing effort levels. When investment banking is uncompetitive, the former effect dominates, and there is too little tying; when investment banking is competitive, there is too much tying. We relate our results to the authority structure of the universal bank, which we argue is the appropriate focus for regulation

We study whether cross‐country differences in regulations have affected international bank flows. We find strong evidence that banks have transferred funds to markets with fewer regulations. This form of regulatory arbitrage suggests there may be a destructive “race to the bottom” in global regulations, which restricts domestic regulators’ ability to limit bank risk‐taking. However, we also find that the links between regulation differences and bank flows are significantly stronger if the recipient country is a developed country with strong property rights and creditor rights. This suggests that, while differences in regulations have important influences, without a strong institutional environment, lax regulations are not enough to encourage massive capital flows

We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of domestic and cross-border bank takeovers in the European Union between 1997 and 2007. We find that acquiring banks value profitable, high-growth and low risk targets. We also find that the strength of bank regulation and supervision as well as deposit insurance regimes in Europe have measurable effects on takeover pricing. Stricter bank regulatory regimes and stronger deposit insurance schemes lower the takeover premiums paid by acquiring banks. This result, presumably in anticipation of higher compliance costs, is driven by domestic deals. Similar qualitative results are found for both the entire sample and the sample of publicly traded targets