Knowledge that Transforms

Lenders are reluctant to finance firms' innovation activities because such activities tend to be opaque, with a high likelihood of negative outcomes that could hamper loan repayment. We posit that public credit registries (PCRs), which play an important role in credit information sharing in many countries, can facilitate financing by reducing adverse selection and moral hazard and increasing bank competition. Using the staggered establishment of PCRs in different countries and an international firm–patent data set, we find that credit information sharing positively affects firm innovation, especially in firms that experience a larger increase in bank debt financing after the establishment of a PCR. This finding is consistent with the notion that credit information sharing promotes firm innovation by easing bank debt financing frictions. We also find a stronger effect in countries that experience a large increase in bank competition after the establishment of a PCR—consistent with increased bank competition serving as a channel through which credit information sharing facilitates bank debt financing, thereby generating a positive effect on firm innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when the established PCR has features that promote credit information sharing. It is also more pronounced for opaque firms and firms in innovation‐intensive industries, indicating that credit information sharing helps to reduce financing frictions. Finally, we posit and find evidence that firm efficiency in transforming innovation inputs into outputs improves after the establishment of a PCR. Overall, our paper offers novel insights into how credit information sharing facilitates firm innovation.

Deferred compensation is often proposed as an instrument to prevent managerial myopia. However, empirical studies show that its practical use is limited when it comes to managerial retirement. We study the optimal design of accounting‐based deferred compensation for retiring managers. While deferred compensation is useful in establishing long‐term incentives, it causes contracting frictions in subsequent periods. Deferred bonuses of retiring managers imply inefficiently weak incentives for incoming managers. This down‐scaling effect renders deferred compensation less useful in providing long‐term incentives. We also find that the down‐scaling effect has implications for the desirability of accounting timeliness—that is, the timely recognition of future cash flows in current accounting earnings—from a stewardship perspective. If managers' long‐term actions are sufficiently important, higher timeliness can cause more myopic managerial incentives.

This study finds that accounting standards play an important role in cross‐border investor reactions to peer firm earnings. Specifically, we document that when international peer firms report under the same accounting standards, investors overreact to peer firms' earnings announcements. Using a sample of 35,116 firm‐pair‐years from 51 countries between 2000 and 2010, we show that heightened information transfers for international same‐standard firms are followed by predictable price reversals when investors observe own‐firm earnings. However, overreactions are not present for international firm‐pairs that follow different accounting standards. While we find that institutional investors learn over time, overreactions do not decline among retail investors. Additional tests suggest that overreactions cause significant excess volatility, which results in economically significant costs. Collectively, our findings document an unintended consequence of financial reporting harmonization in the form of increased investor overreactions.

Critics assert that securities class actions are economically burdensome and yield minimal recoveries, whereas proponents claim they deter wrongdoing. We examine key events in the recent Goldman Sachs Supreme Court case to test the net effect of securities litigation risk on shareholder value. We find that investors view securities class actions as value‐increasing. However, the strength of this effect varies based on external monitoring. Investors view securities class actions as more value‐enhancing when institutional ownership is low. We also use this setting to examine the effect of securities litigation risk on mandatory disclosure because the Goldman Sachs case focuses on mandatory disclosure properties. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find firm risk factor disclosures become shorter and less similar to industry peers, and they contain more uncertain and weak terms. Overall, our results show nuanced effects of securities litigation risk on shareholder value and firm disclosure.

In this paper, we investigate whether federal judge ideology, ceteris paribus, affects auditor litigation risk and auditor behavior. We find that auditors whose client firms are in jurisdictions dominated by liberal judges are more likely to be sued and make higher payouts to plaintiffs when sued. Furthermore, these client firms are more likely to receive going‐concern opinions and pay higher audit fees. Finally, we find no evidence that the quality of audited financial statements is affected by judge ideology. The evidence documented in this paper indicates that federal judge ideology affects auditor litigation risk and some aspects of auditor behavior.

This paper studies voluntary disclosures that firms have suspended, resumed, or completed their open market repurchase programs. Voluntary disclosures of repurchase status updates are common and value‐relevant. They also inform subsequent repurchase activities: voluntary disclosers are more likely to complete their repurchase programs and to initiate new repurchase programs than firms with undisclosed repurchase status changes. Moreover, firms that disclose repurchase suspensions experience larger returns to subsequent repurchase authorizations, consistent with a reward for establishing a reputation for transparency via voluntary bad news disclosure. Finally, exploiting a change in repurchase reporting requirements, we document that voluntary updates are less frequent when mandatory disclosure increases. An important exception, however, is when macroeconomic uncertainty is high, such as during the Great Recession and the COVID‐19 pandemic.

We study the role of segment disaggregation in equity‐based pay contracts in diversified firms. Disaggregated segment disclosures can improve the observability of managerial actions in internal capital markets and thus increase implicit incentives for managers to allocate resources as desired by shareholders, substituting for explicit incentives provided to CEOs. We use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 as an identification strategy and find that firms affected by this segment reporting mandate significantly decreased the provision of equity‐based incentives in the post‐adoption period, especially for firms with higher operating volatilities. This effect is also more pronounced for firms with weaker board monitoring in the pre‐adoption period but with stronger external monitoring in the post‐adoption period. Overall, our results suggest that disaggregated segment disclosures reduce the use of equity‐based pay contracts in diversified firms by enhancing the monitoring of managers.

This study investigates how using technologies that increase the perceived ease of information access, such as search engines, can affect investors' judgments. Relying on the “Google effect” theory, I predict that using a search engine to access financial information will lead to shallower processing of that information, causing earnings fixation. The results of three experiments support this prediction and the theoretical process. Specifically, investors who access financials via a search engine are less likely to react to the information in the income statement other than earnings compared to those who do not use a search engine. In addition, search condition investors are more likely to mention earnings in their investment reasoning and find earnings more influential than the control condition investors. Furthermore, search condition investors believe that information is more likely to be available in the future and are more likely to reopen the income statement. A second experiment shows that the knowledge that the information will be easily reaccessed increases investors' earnings fixation. Finally, a third experiment provides evidence that using a search engine reduces the depth of information processing. This study extends accounting research by showing that using technologies that increase the perceived ease of information access can reduce investors' processing depth and information acquisition.