Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines the effect of shareholder scrutiny of corporate tax avoidance behavior and its related financial reporting. Specifically, we explore the factors associated with shareholder tax litigation and its effect on the future tax behavior of the sued firm and its peers. We find that sued firms have lower cash and GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs) and engage in extreme tax avoidance before litigation. After litigation, they decrease tax avoidance activities, relative to matched control firms. Peer firms in the same industry as sued firms similarly reduce their level of tax avoidance and the likelihood of extreme tax avoidance after the litigation, relative to control firms. Additional analyses suggest that sued firms change their tax avoidance behavior, rather than merely their tax financial reporting. Finally, the spillover results are strongest for peer firms with the most tax avoidance (i.e., the lowest cash ETRs) when the sued firm's alleged misconduct is revealed.

Firms are required to provide financial information via the financial statements and the management discussion and analysis (MD&A), a narrative explanation of the financial statements. Our study examines how firms use the MD&A channel when their financial statement channel is inadequate. We focus on two textual attributes of the MD&A: non‐GAAP disclosure and forward‐looking statements. We find that firms with less adequate financial statements discuss non‐GAAP measures more and provide a larger number of forward‐looking statements. We then identify the topics, and therefore the context, in which non‐GAAP and forward‐looking disclosures are provided. Our study provides evidence on how managers use the MD&A, a relatively more flexible channel, to provide information when their financial statement channel is less adequate.

Building on Banker, Byzalov, and Plehn‐Dujowich's (2014, The Accounting Review , 89 (3), 839–865) congestion cost theory, we model firms' trade‐off between a rigid cost structure and a high inventory level to reduce the congestion costs caused by uncertain demand. We demonstrate that firms with a higher inventory level adopt a less rigid cost structure, but the effect of cost structure on inventory is theoretically ambiguous. Using a large sample of manufacturing firms in the United States, we empirically investigate the dynamic interdependence between cost structure and inventory choices. Our results reveal that cost structure rigidity and inventory are negatively associated with each other over time, suggesting that they serve as substitutes in tackling demand uncertainty. Further analysis demonstrates that firms favor higher inventory levels over more rigid costs when inventory‐carrying costs decrease, fixed input costs increase, or downside risk escalates.

In this study, we examine auditors' reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) systems that are designed to provide evidence around complex estimates. In an experiment with highly experienced auditors, we find that auditors are more hesitant to rely on evidence from AI‐based systems compared to human specialists, consistent with algorithm aversion. Importantly, we also find that a small amount of control (i.e., providing input to specialists) can mitigate this aversion, though this effect depends on auditors' personal locus of control (LOC). Providing input increases reliance on evidence from AI systems for auditors who believe they have little control over their outcomes (i.e., an external LOC). In contrast, auditors with an internal LOC are particularly hesitant to rely on AI‐based evidence, and providing input has little impact on their reliance. Interviews with experienced auditors corroborate our findings and suggest auditors feel a greater sense of control working with human specialists relative to AI‐based systems. Overall, our results suggest perceived control plays an important role in auditors' aversion to AI and that auditors' individual traits can affect this aversion.

This paper studies accounting and silence. Building on studies of accounting talk and introducing theories of “silencing,” we highlight the role of accounting silences in the production of engaging organizational conversations. Through a qualitative case study, we identify three forms of silence—the unspeakable, the unsaid, and the inaudible—and their links to accounting. Silences create motivations to engage in further accounting talk, but they also deny certain groups a voice in those conversations. An impression of participation, openness, and transparency emerges despite unequal access and the silencing of certain groups. Accounting itself can be silenced to avoid uncomfortable topics, potential problems, and anxiety‐inducing uncertainties. This silencing may serve to preserve a useful ignorance, avoid being in the know, and build alluring narratives and engaging conversations. Accounting silences sustain such conversations by protecting them from alternative voices, unsettling knowledge, and narratives that are incompatible with the organization's preferred story.

Discourse proclaiming the advent of a fourth industrial revolution predicts significant disruption to various work domains in the near future. Auditing is one of the domains where bold claims about the potential of technology are being made, with technology expected to augment auditors' judgments and, in time, possibly automate them. Drawing on 44 in‐depth interviews with auditors, regulators, and emergent artificial intelligence software providers, we question the prevailing narrative around technological change in auditing which suggests that ostensibly simple, low‐level technical tasks are areas where little judgment is at play and thus are ripe for automation. We show that significant elements of deliberation, sensemaking, and reflexivity, arguably critical for the socialization of early career auditors into the profession, may be lost when automating areas of work perceived as low value, leading us to question what it means to apply judgment in auditing. Conversely, higher‐level aspects of the audit process may be assisted by technology and augmented in different ways, yet new technological structures generate new areas of indeterminacy that pose new and yet unresolved demands on auditors' judgment. Overall, the paper shows how auditor habits are changing and highlights the risks posed by new technologies to the acquisition of practical knowledge by auditors.

This study investigates whether and how firm‐specific news media coverage affects corporate voluntary disclosure. I predict that media coverage influences managers' disclosure decisions by directing investor attention toward firms and increasing investor demand for firm information. I find that managers are more likely to issue earnings guidance if their recent earnings guidance receives more media coverage. The relation between media coverage and guidance issuance is stronger for news articles that purely disseminate information quickly and are published by news outlets that target institutional investors. Consistent with my hypothesis that media coverage influences investor demand for information, I find evidence that media coverage of guidance positively relates to subsequent institutional information search activity, which in turn positively relates to future guidance issuance. Examining sources of plausibly exogenous variation in media coverage, I find further corroborative evidence of a positive relation between media coverage and earnings guidance. Overall, these analyses indicate that the news media influence managers' provision of voluntary disclosure.

This article examines the effect of managers' personality trait of extraversion on the voluntary disclosure of their firms. Our results from analyzing archival data from Sweden show that the extraversion scores of CEOs and CFOs obtained from psychological tests are positively associated with the voluntary disclosure scores of their firms. The effect of managerial extraversion on disclosure is, moreover, stronger when managerial discretion or managerial job demands are higher. We also find that extraversion affects managers' disclosure styles during earnings conference calls.

We build on recent advances in options pricing research to propose a novel measure of the ex ante relative importance of information events. Our firm‐level measure captures the extent to which investors view an event as important, independent of its realized outcome. We first validate the measure and then demonstrate how it can be used to (1) study heterogeneity across firms in the relative importance of information events; (2) identify firms for which an event was important, even though the realized outcome did not result in a meaningful stock reaction; and (3) examine questions about how the importance of an event impacts firm decisions, where using realized return‐based measures of event importance would result in an endogeneity problem.

In 2018, the European Union (EU) introduced a new mandatory reporting requirement for a wide range of cross‐border tax arrangements (EU Directive 2018/822, also known as DAC6). Unlike prior corporate transparency initiatives, which put the reporting responsibility primarily on the taxpayers, this directive puts the initial reporting responsibility on the third‐party intermediaries who are involved in the reportable arrangement at any stage during the planning and execution process. We exploit the adoption of DAC6 in the EU to examine the effectiveness of third‐party reporting in curbing cross‐border tax planning by multinationals. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that affected firms reduce income shifting and report higher effective tax rates in the post‐adoption period. The reduction in income shifting is stronger for affiliates operating in countries without legal professional privilege extensions and in countries where noncompliance penalties are higher. Our results highlight the importance of strong third‐party reporting requirements in constraining cross‐border tax planning.