This paper shows that there is more scope for a borrower to engage in a sustainable infinite debt rollover (a “Ponzi scheme”) when interest/growth rates are stochastic. In this context, I prove that the relevant “r vs. g” comparison uses the yield r long to an infinite‐maturity zero‐coupon bond. I show that r long is lower than the risk‐neutral expectation of the short‐term yield when it is variable, and that r long is close to the minimal realization of the short‐term yield when it is highly persistent. The paper applies these results to illustrative heterogeneous agent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models to obtain similarly weakened sufficient conditions for the existence of public debt bubbles.

In this paper, I consider a dynamic economy in which a government needs to finance a stochastic process of purchases. The agents in the economy are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time; I impose no restriction on the stochastic evolution of skills. I construct a tax system that implements a symmetric constrained Pareto optimal allocation. The tax system is constrained to be linear in an agent's wealth, but can be arbitrarily nonlinear in his current and past labor incomes. I find that wealth taxes in a given period depend on the individual's labor income in that period and previous ones. However, in any period, the expectation of an agent's wealth tax rate in the following period is zero. As well, the government never collects any net revenue from wealth taxes. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.