This paper examines the demand for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) by Chinese listed companies where controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts are acute due to the concentrated and split ownership structure. We hypothesize and find evidence that the incidence of seeking D&O insurance is positively related to the extent of controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts – a finding not previously documented in the literature. Using an event study, we find that the announcements of D&O insurance decisions in firms that engage in earnings management, and/or are controlled by a local government (such firms tend to have stronger incentives to tunnel), seem to have a negative wealth effect. In addition, the incidence of the D&O insurance decision is positively related to the proportion of independent directors and several litigation risk proxies. Therefore, the breakthrough in corporate governance and judicial reforms has created non-negligible perceived securities litigation risks in China.

Using a unique dataset from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we study the relation between daily open-to-close stock returns and order imbalances, and the commonality in order imbalances across individual, institutional, and proprietary investors. We find that institutional (proprietary) order imbalances have a larger price impact, but account for a significantly smaller proportion of daily price fluctuations. Commonality is much stronger for individual, rather than institutional (proprietary), order imbalances. Institutional (proprietary) investors favor large capitalization stocks, and co-movement in institutional (proprietary) order imbalances is stronger for these stocks.