We investigate the expected consequences of negative environmental, social, and governance (ESG) news on firms' future profits. After learning about negative ESG news, analysts significantly downgrade their forecasts at short and longer horizons. Negative ESG news affects forecasts more strongly at longer horizons than other types of negative corporate news. The negative revisions of earnings forecasts following negative ESG news largely reflect expectations of lower future sales, rather than higher future costs. Quantitatively, forecast revisions can explain most of the negative impacts of ESG news on firm value. Analysts are correct to revise forecasts downward following negative ESG news

This paper establishes that mutual funds strategically time their trades in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) stocks around disclosure dates to inflate their sustainability ratings. This claim is supported by three empirical findings. First, we show that funds' ESG betas increase shortly before disclosure and decrease shortly afterwards. Second, we document that post‐disclosure fund returns are higher but have lower ESG exposure than disclosed portfolios. Third, we provide evidence that ESG stock prices temporarily rise before disclosure and decline afterwards. Overall, we establish that green window dressing positively impacts fund sustainability ratings, performance, and flows

We present a model of competition between environmental, social, and governance (ESG) raters who acquire information about multiple unrelated categories and sell ratings. Raters specializing in different categories maximize the amount of information transmitted and surplus, and can be an equilibrium outcome. When investors place a high value on ESG performance across multiple categories, the unique equilibrium is for the raters to generalize—splitting their effort among the categories, resulting in less informative ratings. Greenwashing by firms can make generalization the only equilibrium. We also demonstrate that specialization maximizes ratings disagreement, and thus empirical measures of disagreement may be poor measures of surplus

We find that long‐term institutional investors tilt their portfolios toward firms with better Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) profiles, in the cross sections of both institutional investor portfolios and the ownership of firms. We test whether several theoretically motivated mechanisms can explain this relationship. Our results that long‐term investors exhibit patience with firms around poor earnings announcements, but quickly sell portfolio firms after negative ES incidents, support the view that long‐ and short‐term investors evaluate information differently. Our evidence shows that limits‐to‐arbitrage play a role, as we find that investors' ESG tilt weakens following regulatory shocks that shorten their horizon

In this address, I discuss differences across investor and manager motivations for considering sustainable finance— value versus values motivations—and how these differences contribute to misunderstandings about environmental, social, and governance investment approaches. The finance research community has the ability and responsibility to help clear up these misunderstandings through additional research, which I suggest.

We study the asset market for pollutive plants. Firms divest pollutive plants in response to environmental pressures. Buyers are firms facing weaker environmental pressures that have supply chain relationships or joint ventures with the sellers. While pollution levels do not decline following divestitures, sellers highlight their sustainable policies in subsequent conference calls, earn higher returns as they sell more pollutive plants, and benefit from higher Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) ratings and lower compliance costs. Overall, the asset market allows firms to redraw their boundaries in a manner perceived as environmentally friendly without real consequences for pollution but with substantial gains from trade

Growing discussions of impact investing and stakeholder capitalism have increased interest in measuring companies' social impact. We conceptualize corporate social impact as the welfare loss that would be caused by a firm's exit. To illustrate, we quantify the social impacts of 74 firms in 12 industries using a new survey measuring consumer and worker substitution patterns combined with models of product and labor markets. We find that consumer surplus is the primary component of social impact, suggesting that consumer impacts deserve more attention from impact investors. Existing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) and social impact ratings are essentially unrelated to our economically grounded measures