Knowledge that Transforms

Journal Article Introduction Get access Robert J. Babro, Robert J. Babro Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Paul M. Romer Paul M. Romer Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 106, Issue 2, May 1991, Page i, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/106.2.i Published: 01 May 1991

We examine the connection between exchange rates and foreign direct investment that arises when globally integrated capital markets are subject to informational imperfections. These imperfections cause external financing to be more expensive than internal financing, so that changes in wealth translate into changes in the demand for direct investment. By systematically lowering the relative wealth of domestic agents, a depreciation of the domestic currency can lead to foreign acquisitions of certain domestic assets. We develop a simple model of this phenomenon and test for its relevance in determining international capital flows.

Using an endogenous growth model in which learning by doing, although bounded in each good, exhibits spillovers across goods, this paper investigates the dynamic effects of international trade. Examining an LDC and a DC, the latter distinguished by a higher initial level of knowledge, under autarky and free trade, I find that under free trade the LDC (DC) experiences rates of technical progress and GOP growth less than or equal (greater than or equal) to those enjoyed under autarky. Unless the LDC's population is several orders of magnitude greater than that of the DC and the initial technical gap between the two economies is not large, the LDC will be unable to catch up with its trading partner. Hence, in terms of technical progress and growth, the LDC experiences dynamic losses from trade, whilst the DC experiences dynamic gains. However, since technical progress abroad can improve welfare at home, LDC consumers may enjoy - higher intertemporal utility along the free trade path. In the case of DC consumers, as long as their economy is not overtaken by the LDC they will enjoy both more rapid technical progress and the traditional static gains from trade, and hence experience an unambiguous improvement in intertemporal welfare.

We develop a two-country model of endogenous innovation and imitation in order to study the interactions between these two processes. Firms in the North race to bring out the next generation of a set of technology-intensive products. Each product potentially can be improved a countably infinite number of times, but quality improvements require the investment of resources and entail uncertain prospects of success. In the South entrepreneurs invest resources in order to learn the production processes that have been developed in the North. All R&D investment decisions are made by forward-looking, profit-maximizing entrepreneurs. The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by constant aggregate rates of innovation and imitation. We study how these rates respond to changes in the sizes of the two regions and to policies in each region to promote learning.

Journal Article Consistent Wage Offer and Reservation Wage Distributions Get access Michael Sattinger Michael Sattinger State University of New York at Albany Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 106, Issue 1, February 1991, Pages 277–288, https://doi.org/10.2307/2937916 Published: 01 February 1991

Journal Article The Euclidean Distance Approach to Continuous Utility Functions Get access Ghanshyam Mehta Ghanshyam Mehta University of Queensland, Australia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 106, Issue 3, August 1991, Pages 975–977, https://doi.org/10.2307/2937938 Published: 01 August 1991

A country's most talented people typically organize production by others, so they can spread their ability advantage over a larger scale. When they start firms, they innovate and foster growth, but when they become rent seekers, they only redistribute wealth and reduce growth. Occupational choice depends on returns to ability and to scale in each sector, on market size, and on compensation contracts. In most countries, rent seeking rewards talent more than entrepreneurship does, leading to stagnation. Our evidence shows that countries with a higher proportion of engineering college majors grow faster; whereas countries with a higher proportion of law concentrators grow slower.

I test for the importance of wage rigidities from long-term contracts by observing how employment responds when firms and workers recontract. If rigidities are important, then employment should adjust after recontracting to partially undo its movements during the past contract. I examine twelve manufacturing industries that display a strong bargaining pattern. I find employment does rebound after recontracting, particularly in motor vehicles. This implies that contract rigidities are important. I also find responses in wage growth at the beginning of new contracts; but these responses are not related to the pattern of employment responses across industries.

I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the intertemporal equalization of optimal tax rates. The conditions in the case of wage taxes include constant-elasticity labor supply and constant relative risk aversion. Wage taxes should be low in times of relatively elastic labor supply, or low risk aversion. The conditions in the case of capital taxes include perfect-foresight expectations and constant relative risk aversion. If foresight is imperfect, intertemporal equality will be impeded by a covariance term; if relative risk aversion is time-varying, next period's capital tax should have the same sign as this period's change in relative risk aversion.

A reconsideration of the Pigovian theory of regulating externalities via taxation is undertaken for environments with private information. The presence of private information may have no effect on the social optimum; but when it has an impact, it is to cause a group of different agents to share the same production or consumption levels. The model developed provides an appealing characterization of when such situations transpire: they occur when the individuals who desire most to engage in some activity are the ones who society least wants to participate. Since such instances could potentially be regulated by the imposition of quantity controls, this may explain authorities' apparent predilection for quantity limits rather than tax-cum-subsidy schemes to manage many externalities.