Knowledge that Transforms

In rational, efficiently functioning and complete markets, returns on derivative and underlying securities should be perfectly contemporaneously correlated. Due to market imperfections, one of these markets may reflect information faster. The use of high-frequency data and the choice for a small unit time interval to measure these lead-lag relations comes at the cost of some or many missing observations, causing traditional estimators to either under- or overestimate covariances and correlations. We use a new estimator to estimate lead-lag relationships between the cash AEX index, options and futures. We find that futures returns lead both options and cash index returns by approximately 10 minutes. The relationship between options and the cash market is not completely unidirectional.

This paper uses a large sample containing the complete return histories of 2300UK openended mutual funds over a 23-year period to measure fund performance. We find some evidence of underperformance on a risk-adjusted basis by the average fund manager, persistenceof performance and the existence of a substantial survivor bias. Similar findings have been reported for US equity mutual funds. New findings not previously documented for other markets include evidence that mutual fund performance varies substantially across different asset categories, especially foreign asset categories. We also identify some new patterns in performance related to the funds' distance from their inception and termination dates: underperformance intensifies as the fund termination date approaches, while, in contrast, there is some evidence that funds (weakly) outperform during their first year of existence.

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in the United States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision. We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter 7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is that a financially distressed firm chooses its action in order to minimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- and under-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates a workout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter 11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i) in default, total firm value and equity value increase upon the announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcement of Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt are more likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firms that renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firms entering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industries than for firms in growth industries.

The paper derives closed-form formulas for the futures price in the presence of a multi-asset quality option. This is done for two cases: In the first one the underlying assets are zero coupon bonds with different maturities in the single-factor Vasicek model. In the second one these are commodities in a multi-factor setting, again with Vasicek interest rate uncertainty.

We show in any economy trading options, with investors having mean-variance preferences, that there are arbitrage opportunities resulting from negative prices for out of the money call options. The theoretical implication of this inconsistency is that mean-variance analysis is vacuous. The practical implications of this inconsistency are investigated by developing an option pricing model for a CAPM type economy. It is observed that negative call prices begin to appear at strikes that are two standard deviations out of the money. Such out-of-the money options often trade. For near money options, the CAPM option pricing model is shown to permit estimation of the mean return on the underlying asset, its volatility and the length of the planning horizon. The model is estimated on S&P 500 futures options data covering the period January 1992–September 1994. It is found that the mean rate of return though positive, is poorly identified. The estimates for the volatility are stable and average 11%, while those for the planning horizon average 0.95. The hypothesis that the planning horizon is a year can not be rejected. The one parameter Black–Scholes model also marginally outperforms the three parameter CAPM model with average percentage errors being respectively, 3.74% and 4.5%. This out performance of the Black–Scholes model is taken as evidence consistent with the mean-variance analysis being vacuous in a practical sense as well.

Comment on ‘Matching Organizational Structure with Firm Attributes: A study of Master Limited Partnerships’ Claudio Loderer Claudio Loderer Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Review of Finance, Volume 1, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 193–196, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009792007996 Published: 01 August 1997

Firms in performance decline may choose a variety of restructuring strategies for recovery with conflicting welfare implications for different stakeholders such as shareholders, lenders and managers. Choice of recovery strategies is therefore determined by the complex interplay of ownership structure, corporate governance and lender monitoring of such firms. For a sample of 297 U.K. firms experiencing relative stock return decline during 1987–93, we examine the impact of these factors as well as other control factors on their turnaround strategies. Strategy choices during the decline year and two post-decline years are modelled with logit regressions. Our results show that turnaround strategy choices are significantly influenced by both agency and control variables. While there is agreement among stakeholders on certain strategies there is also evidence of conflict of interests among them. Thereis further evidence of shifting coalitions of stakeholders for or against certain strategies.

This study of warrants on the London Stock Exchange examines whether they display particular pricing biases and whether investors understand how to value them at the time of issue. In a sample of 72 warrants on closed-end funds (investment trusts) over the 1985–94 period, more than one third of the 12,673 prices are anomalously low. The other two thirds behave like stock options, with lower volatility when they are in-the-money or have a long time until maturity. Despite their frequent undervaluation, it is rational to add warrants to a new equity issue: an examination of 127 new equity issues (95 with warrants) reveals that attaching warrants significantly increases market value. The reason for this appears to be investor confusion: they do not seem to understand that the more the warrants are worth, the less the value of the ordinary shares.

While intercorporate shareownership is common among publicly traded firms, systematic empirical evidence on this particular aspect of corporate ownership structure is sparse. Based largely on aggregated ownership data provided by various stock exchanges, we know that intercorporate holdings represent a relatively large proportion (above 40%) of the total equity value of exchange- listed firms in Japan and Germany, and a relatively low proportion (less than 10%) in the U.S. and the U.K. Thus, the Anglo-American corporate governance system appears to produce substantially lower levels of intercorporate shareholdings than does the German– Japanese governance model. While financial institutions in Germany and Japan play an integral role in the governance structures of those countries, securities laws inspired by early populist sentiments in the U.S. have prevented American financial institutions from playing a similar active role.1 Much like the Anglo-American system, securities laws in Norway, the empirical laboratory of Bøhren and Norli (1997), also restrict the equity ownership and direct corporate governance participation of financial institutions. Perhaps as a result the level of intercorporate