We examine the relation between a board' decision to reject antitakeover provisions of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 and subsequent labor market opportunities of those same board members. Compared to directors retaining all provisions, directors rejecting all protective provisions of SB1310 are three times as likely to gain additional external directorships and are 30 percent more likely to retain their internal slot on the board of that same Pennsylvania company. For external board seats, the results are driven by nonexecutive directors who are not members of the management team; for internal board seats, the results are driven by executive directors.

We find that social capital, as captured by associational networks and social norms in US counties where corporate headquarters are located, is positively associated with cash dividend payouts in local firms. The positive effect is incremental to other known local factors affecting dividends, is robust to a range of sensitivity analyses, and extends to corporate decisions about whether to pay dividends or not. Social capital mitigates managerial private financial incentives to limit dividends and encourages higher dividends among firms facing greater free cash flow problems. Social capital also attenuates over-investment of free cash flow.

We find that firms headquartered in U.S. counties with higher levels of social capital incur lower bank loan spreads. This finding is robust to using organ donation as an alternative social capital measure and incremental to the effects of religiosity, corporate social responsibility, and tax avoidance. We identify the causal relation using companies with a social-capital-changing headquarters relocation. We also find that high-social-capital firms face loosened nonprice loan terms, incur lower at-issue bond spreads, and prefer public bonds over bank loans. We conclude that debt holders perceive social capital as providing environmental pressure that constrains opportunistic firm behaviors in debt contracting.