Over the last decades, firms have been incorporating digital technologies into their operations, a process known as digitalization. Nevertheless, understanding the link between digitalization and firm performance remains challenging. We propose a new firm-level measure of digital intensity based on textual analysis of business descriptions and quarterly earnings calls. To overcome endogeneity, we use two quasi-natural experiments: the COVID-19 pandemic and shocks involving suppliers affected by U.S. natural disasters. Non-technological firms with higher pre-shock digital intensity experience higher abnormal returns, higher profitability, and higher revenue growth during the shocks. The supply chain is one of the areas through which digitalization contributes to significantly mitigate the effects of these shocks, thereby enhancing firm resilience.

Horizontal directors, board members who also hold board seats in same-industry peers, are common in U.S. corporations. We posit that horizontal directorships can enhance the efficiency of corporate investment decisions. Horizontal directors enjoy access to current information flows, which help boards fulfill their roles of advising and monitoring – a form of learning from peers. We find that horizontal directorships are negatively related to investment inefficiency, and with over-investment in particular. Exogenous shocks to board composition provide a causal interpretation to our findings. Our paper contributes to a nuanced view of horizontal directors by highlighting their contribution to mitigate excessive investment.

This paper investigates how the investment horizon of a firm's institutional shareholders impacts the market for corporate control. We find that target firms with short-term shareholders are more likely to receive an acquisition bid but get lower premiums. This effect is robust and economically significant: Targets whose shareholders hold their stocks for less four months, one standard deviation away from the average holding period of 15 months, exhibit a lower premium by 3%. In addition, we find that bidder firms with short-term shareholders experience significantly worse abnormal returns around the merger announcement, as well as higher long-run underperformance. These findings suggest that firms held by short-term investors have a weaker bargaining position in acquisitions. Weaker monitoring from short-term shareholders could allow managers to proceed with value-reducing acquisitions or to bargain for personal benefits (e.g., job security, empire building) at the expense of shareholder returns.