Knowledge that Transforms

Estimates of central bank intervention losses or profits vary widely; some estimates find substantial losses, others profits. In most cases, estimated profits are not risk-adjusted, and risk adjustment can have large effects. Furthermore, profit estimates involve variables integrated of order one, and because of this test-statistics may have nonstandard distributions; few studies take this into account. Estimates of risk-adjusted profits for the US Fed and the Swedish Riksbank, with allowances for possible nonstandard distributions, suggest that neither made losses and might have made significant profits.

We assess the effects of the introduction and passage of state nonshareholder constituency statutes on shareholder wealth. We find a small, but significantly negative effect on shareholder wealth for companies incorporated in states passing nonshareholder constituency statutes that did not already have corporate takeover defenses in place. Further, we find that firms that are poorly managed (as proxied by low market-to-book ratios) react more negatively to the statutes.

In view of the acceptance of short selling of stocks as an investment tool in the portfolio context by a growing number of institutional investors in recent years, the present study considers both normative and market-equilibrium aspects of portfolio selection with short selling. Under the full-information covariance structure of security returns, the study accurately captures institutional procedures for short selling without sacrificing analytical tractability. While short selling enhances the portfolio's risk-return trade-off from a normative perspective, the equilibrium analysis reveals that there is a continuum of market-clearing prices within two boundaries for each security. Economic implications of the equilibrium pricing relationship are also explored in the study.

The payments literature ranges from theoretical general equilibrium models to practical payment issues related to the day-to-day operation of various national networks for the transfer of money. It is an area where economic theory and institutional structure are often closely intertwined and it is currently undergoing significant change, shifting from costly paper-based systems to technologically advanced electronic payments. The extant literature is surveyed here with the aim of integrating the various strands of payment research which have been largely pursued separately. In addition, we present newly available data to illustrate and investigate a number of underdeveloped areas in this literature.

This paper presents an empirical investigation of the merger process among mutuals, using a large pooled cross section/time series sample of UK building societies between 1981 and 1993.The financial services industry is probably unique in having a substantial mutual sector coexisting with, and competing against, joint-stock firms. However, given the severely attenuated system of ownership claims in the financial mutual, it has been widely predicted that this form will exhibit strong behavioural differences from the stock sector. It is surprising, therefore, that despite the important governance role accorded to mergers in the corporate literature, the merger process among financial mutuals has been almost totally ignored. This paper explores the mutual merger process via an examination of the targets' characteristics. It finds little support for the ‘natural selection’ view of mutual acquisitions, but it does reveal the importance of the regulatory process. Above all, the results show a surprising similarity to those from studies of the merger process in joint-stock firms.

In this paper I analyze a tender offer to shareholders who can influence the outcome of the offer, and I show that several results from atomistic shareholder models no longer hold when shareholders are influential. I find closed-form solutions for the probability that a shareholder tenders in the presence of a foothold position or dilution, and I examine the relation between a conditional and an unconditional offer.

This paper examines transactions data regarding the market's reaction to 258 takeover announcements on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1977 to 1989. The study analyzes volatility and volume of target firm's stock during the first trading day following a takeover announcement. A cross-sectional analysis relates this intraday volatility and volume to various aspects of a takeover announcement that proxy for the certainty of payoff to shareholders. Post-announcement volatility is highest when takeover announcements involve share exchange bids which are contested. Trading volume is highest when bids are contested and involve a large initial price change.

Traditional theories of intermediation are based on transaction costs and asymmetric information. They are designed to account for institutions which take deposits or issue insurance policies and channel funds to firms. However, in recent decades there have been significant changes. Although transaction costs and asymmetric information have declined, intermediation has increased. New markets for financial futures and options are mainly markets for intermediaries rather than individuals or firms. These changes are difficult to reconcile with the traditional theories. We discuss the role of intermediation in this new context stressing risk trading and participation costs.

Recent occurrences of financial distress to some insurers have raised questions about whether the current guaranty system is adequate to protect policyholders. Four new systems have been proposed. Using the state preference model, it was found the Stewart's national system faring the best, if it adopts uniform regulation. Based on agency theory, the pre-assessment approach and the policyholder surcharge (or premium increase) recoupment method were found to be better than the current post-assessment approach and premium tax offset method. Furthermore, uniform policy limits and regulations are recommended.