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Investor Relations and Private Debt Markets

The Accounting Review 2025 100(4), 109-133 open access
We examine the role of investor relations (IR) in private debt markets. We find that firms with dedicated IR officers (IROs) receive significantly lower loan spreads, particularly when lenders require a better understanding of the borrower’s risk profile. Among firms with IROs, those with longer tenured officers experience lower spreads, especially when IROs also manage financial responsibilities. To address endogeneity concerns, we demonstrate that loan spreads decline when a firm establishes an IR program and rise when the program is discontinued. Furthermore, when a different individual assumes the IRO role, loan spreads increase, even though there are no reductions in firm disclosure. Loans issued to firms with IROs also have shorter syndication duration, attract more nonrelationship, foreign, and nonbank participant lenders, feature more customized covenants, and are less likely to undergo renegotiation. Overall, our study provides robust evidence of the relevance of IR in private debt markets.

The Effect of Information Opacity and Accounting Irregularities on Personal Lending Relationships: Evidence from Lender and Manager Co-Migration

The Accounting Review 2019 94(4), 303-344
We examine how personal lending relationships between lenders and managers are affected by information and accounting environments of borrowing firms. We address this question by exploring whether, following managerial turnover, lenders migrate with the manager from the firm where a relationship developed (origin firm) to the manager's new firm (destination firm). We find that the opacity of the external information environment of the destination firm significantly increases the probability of lenders' co-migration, while accounting irregularities at both the destination and origin firms decrease it. We also show that co-migration is affected by a lender's monitoring efficiency. A lender's monitoring efficiency increases its co-migration probability when a manager moves to an opaque firm, but not when she moves to a transparent one. When the destination or origin firm experiences accounting irregularities, even lenders with strong monitoring capabilities are mostly reluctant to continue their relationship with a migrating manager.