Knowledge that Transforms

Auditors are expected to identify and resolve material misstatements (MMs) in management's financial statements. However, beyond the audit opinion, the audit process is opaque. To address this, we independently survey 462 audit partners and interview 24 audit partners, CFOs, and audit committee members on how partners assess and address MM risk, resolve MMs, and the consequences of MMs. Partners identify MMs in approximately 9% (15%) of public (private) engagements and use qualitative factors to waive apparent MMs. Loan covenant and going‐concern issues increase MM risk more than earnings benchmark issues. Partners point to a variety of both auditor and client factors as threats to audit effectiveness. Partners often rely on rapport with management and involve the national office and audit committee in resolving MMs. Partner incentives around restatements are context specific. Our results provide new insights into the auditor's role in financial reporting that are relevant to academics, practitioners, and regulators.

We exploit the staggered state‐level adoption of the Riegle‐Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) to examine how banking deregulation and the resulting increase in bank competition affect firms’ auditor choices. We find that an exogenous increase in the degree of interstate branch banking deregulation leads to a reduction in firms’ propensity to engage a Big N or industry expert auditor. This main result, when combined with our cross‐sectional analyses, offers evidence suggesting that deregulation leads to less demand for higher quality auditors because (1) firms have increased access to credit, which reduces the benefits of higher audit quality; (2) entering banks’ lending expertise substitutes for higher quality financial statements; (3) incumbent banks with less lending expertise seek to protect their rents by preferring that borrowers provide lower quality financial statement information; and (4) external stakeholders delegate their monitoring to banks to a greater degree, resulting in less demand for higher quality financial statements. As such, our study sheds light on how the U.S. credit market's infrastructure shapes firms’ auditor choice decisions.

This paper studies whether firms opportunistically make proprietary claims in mandatory environmental disclosure programs with trade secret exemption rules. Examining the mandatory chemical disclosure program in the fracking industry, I find evidence of opportunistic withholding of information among operators that are less likely to have trade secrets. Specifically, I find that these operators claim fewer chemicals as trade secrets when the operating site is in close proximity to water quality monitors. This is only observed among publicly traded operators that face a higher cost of societal backlash when disclosing pollutant information. Further analyses suggest that these operators are concerned about external environmental monitoring, which deters them from opportunistic information withholding. Regarding public and private operators that are more likely to have trade secrets, I do not find strong evidence that their information withholding varies with the monitoring conditions.

Complaints from institutional investors suggest that principles‐based disclosure regimes that rely on financial materiality standards produce inadequate nonfinancial environmental and social (E&S) information. Using the staggered introduction of 40 country‐level regulations that mandate disclosure, I document that reporting E&S information relates to increased investment from institutional owners and has material effects on firms’ investment and financing decisions. Firms mandated to disclose E&S information allocate more investment toward long‐term, innovative projects and raise more equity capital. Evidence indicates that disclosure attracts long‐term–oriented institutional clientele with E&S preferences, which then feeds back on firm decision making. Although the effects of nonfinancial disclosure are similar to those of improved financial disclosure, this clientele mechanism is unique. Taken together, these results suggest that jurisdictions that rely solely on financial materiality disclosure standards create nonfinancial information frictions with material effects on investors and firm decision making.

This paper investigates the role of corporate financial reports in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulatory activities. By tracking the EPA's direct retrieval of SEC filings, we identify three key findings. First, the EPA retrieves a large volume of financial reports, especially from firms in high‐pollution industries. Second, the EPA is more likely to access financial reports during enforcement investigations and significant rule proposals, but less so during compliance monitoring, with patterns varying predictably across firms. Third, the EPA's reliance on financial reports is potentially driven by its demand for information on firm liquidity, solvency, and profitability. Overall, our study highlights the usefulness of financial reports for the EPA as an environmental regulator.

I examine how investors’ search for different types of information affects managers’ reporting decisions. I distinguish investors’ search for information about firm fundamentals (“fundamental search”) from their search for information about managers’ incentives (“incentive search”). Based on a parsimonious model of misreporting, I predict that fundamental search reduces the earnings response coefficient, which reduces managers’ benefits from misreporting, resulting in less misreporting. In contrast, incentive search increases the earnings response coefficient, which increases the benefits from misreporting, resulting in more misreporting. I test these predictions using an empirical technique that classifies EDGAR downloads as fundamental search or incentive search. Consistent with my theoretical predictions, I find that fundamental (incentive) search is negatively (positively) related to the earnings response coefficients and intentional restatements. I confirm my findings in two distinct empirical settings where the costs of information search exogenously changed: the adoption of XBRL and the electronic filing mandate of Form 4s. Collectively, the results show that investors’ information demand can shape managers’ reporting decisions, and its effects can vary depending on the type of information investors search for.

We document significant increases in bond market liquidity around earnings announcements. These increases are attributed to decreased search and bargaining costs, which arise from the over‐the‐counter (OTC) nature of bond markets and outweigh increases in information asymmetry during these periods. Our evidence traces reductions in search and bargaining costs to two sources around earnings announcements: (1) improved access to dealers and (2) increased participation from institutional investors, who can more easily transact with multiple dealers. Overall, our findings highlight a novel channel through which firm‐specific information affects asset prices.

Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs. We document that such firms routinely disclose information that harms their peers' stock prices, and sometimes explicitly mention the harmed peers, by name, in these disclosures. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer‐harming disclosures appear to be aimed at peers whose stock price depressions are most likely to benefit the disclosing firms' CEOs. The pricing effect of these disclosures does not reverse, suggesting that the disclosures contain legitimate information regarding peers' prospects. In sum, our results suggest that relative performance evaluation in CEO pay motivates CEOs to internalize the externalities of their disclosures, and strategically disclose information that harms peers' stock prices, in order to improve their firms' relative standing within their peer group.

We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference‐in‐Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close” industry peers of the fraudulent firms relative to “distant” industry peers. The spillover effect is particularly strong when the close peers and the fraudulent firm share common analyst coverage and common institutional ownership, which have been shown to be powerful proxies for fundamental linkages and information complementarities. We provide evidence that increase in the cost of capital of peer firms is due, at least in part, to “beta shocks.” Disclosure by close peers—especially those with co‐coverage and co‐ownership links—also increases following fraud revelation. Although disclosure remains high in the following years, the cost of equity starts to decrease.

We find that foreign‐born CEOs are more inclined than domestic‐born ones to acquire across borders, and that this inclination is explained by their preference for targets in their birth country. This preference is motivated by foreign‐born CEOs’ information advantage in their birth country and by these CEOs’ desire to give back to the birth country. CEOs’ desire to help their birth country also influences target location, increasing the likelihood of a target in countries that colonized the CEO birth country. The motives that drive acquisitions in acquirer CEOs’ birth countries measurably affect the returns of acquirers’ shareholders, target premium, and acquisition synergy. Both acquirers’ returns and synergy but not target premium are abnormally positive when the motive for an acquisition is a CEO's information advantage in the birth country. Targets premiums but not acquirers’ returns and synergy are abnormally positive when the motive for an acquisition is the desire to give back to the CEO's birth country.