Prior research documents a negative link between risk and executive holding of stock, but a corresponding positive link for options. We find a similar negative relation for non-executive holding of stock. Our finding is consistent with the view that non-executives not only face significant incentives to reduce risk when they hold stock, but they are also able to affect corporate risk. While endogeneity cannot be ruled out fully, the results of a battery of tests suggest that it plays a limited role. A second robust result is that the documented relation becomes more negative as option-based executive compensation increases. Overall, corporate risk is related to the incentives created by stock and options held by both executives and non-executives, as well as interactions among those incentives.

We posit that a change in analyst interest in a firm is an early indicator of the firm's future fundamentals, capital market activities, and stock returns. We measure increases in analyst interest by obser.ving analysts who do not cover a firm but participate in that firm's earnings conference call, and we measure decreases in analyst interest by observing analysts who cover a firm, yet are absent from that firm's call. We find that increases in analyst interest are positively associated with future changes in firm fundamentals and capital market activities, while decreases in analyst interest are negatively associated with capital market activities. We also find that increases (decreases) in analyst interest are positively (negatively) correlated with future stock returns over the next three months and that a hedge portfolio yields a significant abnormal return. Overall, our study shows that analyst interest is a novel and early indicator of future firm fundamentals and capital market consequences.

Disclosure is of fundamental interest to accounting research. When the sign/magnitude of disclosed news is unclear, the information in disclosure events is inferred using the ratio of return volatilities during event and non-event windows (Beaver 1968). We show that return noise due to microstructure frictions and mispricing affects this ratio, and that effect is comparable to or exceeds that of information content. We use the SEC's Tick Size Pilot program to confirm the causal effect of return noise on the ratio, and to evaluate alternative ways to control for it. The most promising approach is to use the difference between, rather than the ratio of, return volatilities during event and non-event windows. We illustrate its benefits by showing how it alters prior inferences regarding time-series and cross-sectional variation in information content as well as changes in the information content of earnings announcements around the 2004 amendments to Form 8-K filings.