Knowledge that Transforms

In this article, I evaluate the hypothesis that firms respond to negative demand shocks by assigning workers to tasks that require less skill than the tasks they normally carry out. Using changes in employment in state‐industry cells as a measure of demand conditions facing individual firms, I provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis. Furthermore, the skill requirements of the tasks carried out by workers are procyclical. The results are consistent with a specific capital model where employers move workers between tasks so that layoffs are concentrated on workers with low levels of firm‐specific human capital.

Theories of turnover and wage dynamics have studied the impact of wage levels on turnover, but they have failed explicitly to model the role of wage growth in predicting turnover. This article presents a theory of turnover that explains why within‐job wage growth reduces the likelihood of worker‐firm separations. The model determines the evolution of value among jobs that differ systematically in permanent rates of wage growth and shows that the value of high wage‐growth jobs increases faster. With additional assumptions about the search process, this proposition implies that high wage‐growth jobs are less likely to end.

Using Danish firm (workplace) data on employment reallocation merged with individual records, the effects of job creation/destruction and worker reallocation on wages are estimated using fixed effects techniques. After controlling for business cycle fluctuations, job creation is found to increase male wages. The effect of net job creation seems present at all phases of the business cycle. Entry wages as well as wages of low tenure workers appear much more sensitive to idiosyncratic job creation than wages of those who are already employed in a given firm. Except for entry wages, female wages are found insensitive to net job creation.

This paper develops a game‐theoretic model that endogenizes the items included in the bargaining agenda. The model's equilibria suggest two possible sources of inefficiency: (1) exclusion of items from the bargaining agenda and (2) delay to agreement due to negotiations over the bargaining agenda. Evidence from union contract negotiations is provided to demonstrate the relevance of these sources of inefficiency. The model also allows strategic delegation by the union. In certain equilibria, the surplus‐maximizing union selects wage‐maximizing delegates (such as senior union members) to negotiate the contract.

We analyze the link between workers' discretion and incentives in an organization that lasts for several periods. In a long‐lasting affiliation, it is possible for the principal to learn and update her beliefs about essential characteristics associated with either the job or the agent. This learning possibility has an important effect on the link between workers' discretion and incentives.

We study imperfect competition in the labor market when both workers and firms are heterogeneous. When firms cannot observe workers' skill, firms pay workers equal wages, but workers absorb training costs. When firms can identify worker types, firms pay different net wages to different workers. Voters select the level of general education that is financed by a lump‐sum tax. Workers are on average better off when firms can observe workers' skill for a given level of general human capital, but the median voter prefers a higher level of general human capital when firms cannot observe worker types.

Workers paid by the piece should be happy to introduce new techniques that increase output, but firms always seem to reduce the piece rate when workers start earning too much money. Workers respond by restricting output and keeping good new ideas to themselves. We show that this outcome is inevitable in a competitive environment. However, there are noncompetitive situations where firms can use piece rates to get cooperation from their workers. These predictions are consistent with case history evidence from the cotton spinning industry in England in the nineteenth century and the Lincoln Electric Company in the United States even today. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.

This article offers an explanation of the postinjury employment, wage, and accommodation patterns of permanently impaired workers. In particular, it argues that the observed tendency of time‐ofaccident employers to rehire at the preinjury wage, accommodate, and then, perhaps, quickly terminate the impaired worker, is a manifestation of the worker's preferred contract. That contract is characterized by wage inflexibility. By removing the opportunity for the postinjury employer to underreport productivity, this contract creates an incentive for the worker to attempt to functionally adapt to the impairment, thereby increasing expected lifetime utility.

The paper analyzes an important aspect of the contemporary reorganization of work within firms: the shift from “Tayloristic” organization (characterized by specialization by tasks) to “holistic” organization (featuring job rotation, integration of tasks and learning across tasks). We examine four driving forces behind this restructuring process: advances in production technologies promoting technological task complementarities, advances in information technologies promoting informational task complementarities, changes in worker preferences in favor of versatile work, and advances in human capital that make workers more versatile. Our analysis can also help explain the recent widening of wage differentials and disparities in job opportunities, not only between occupational, educational, and industry groups, but also within these groups. We are indebted to Michael Orszag for his insightful comments, and have benefited from the suggestions of Ruth Klinov, Reuben Gronau, Eric Mellander, Torsten Persson, Jorgen Weibull, and seminar participants at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research (Stockholm), the Institute for International Economic Studies (Stockholm), and an anonymous referee. We have profited from discussions with Solveig Wikstrom on the reorganization of firms, and are grateful to Jorgen Nilsson for drawing the figures. MULTI-TASK LEARNING AND THE REORGANIZATION OF WORK 1

In this article, we provide quantitative evidence on the effects of monetary incentive schemes designed to reduce racial differences in school attainment and earnings. Our analysis is based on the structural estimation of a dynamic model of schooling, work, and occupational choice decisions over the life cycle. We consider two recent proposals that, although not specifically targeted to blacks, can be expected to have differential racial impacts. One proposal, suggested by Robert Reich, provides a high school graduation bonus to youths from lower‐income families. The other, suggested by Edmund Phelps, provides wage subsidies to low‐wage workers.