Knowledge that Transforms

This paper estimates the impact of college teaching on students’ academic achievement and labor market outcomes using administrative data from Bocconi University matched with tax records. The estimation exploits the random allocation of students to teachers in a fixed sequence of compulsory courses. We find that teacher effects on students' academic and labor market outcomes are only mildly positively correlated and that the professors who are best at improving the academic achievement of their students are not always also the ones who boost their earnings the most. For the least able students, the correlation between the academic and labor market effectiveness of teachers turns out to be negative.

In many countries, grade retention is viewed as a useful tool for helping students who fall behind in their achievement. We show how the effect of grade retention varies by abilities, by timing of retention and as time since retention elapses. While existing studies of grade retention also recognize the importance of studying variation by abilities and timing, the existing methods are not well-equipped to deal with the possibility that students retained at different grades differ in unobservable abilities (dynamic selection) and the effects of retention also vary by the student's abilities and the time at which the student is retained. We extend existing factor analytic methods for identifying treatment effects to control for dynamic selection in our time-varying treatment effect setting. This approach can be understood as a hybrid between a control function and a generalization of the fixed effects approach. Applying our method to nationally-representative, longitudinal data, we find evidence of dynamic selection into retention and that the treatment effect of retention varies considerably across grades and unobservable abilities of students. Our strategy can be applied more broadly to many time-varying or multiple treatment settings.

We use linked employer-employee data from Italy to explore the relationship between exports and wages. Exploiting the 1992 devaluation of the lira, we show that exporting firms both pay a wage premium above what their workers would earn in the outside labor market (the “rent-sharing” effect) and employ workers whose skills command a higher price after the devaluation (the “skill composition” effect). The latter only emerges once we allow for the value of workers’ skills to differ in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. We also document that the export wage premium is larger for workers with more export-related experience.

The cost of divorce influences the bargaining position of spouses and thus their behavior within the marriage. This study takes advantage of a major and unexpected reduction in divorce costs in Spain to estimate the causal effects on domestic violence. Results suggest a 30% decline in spousal conflict as a consequence of the reform. Spousal violence is found to have decreased among couples who remained married after the modification in the law, which suggests an important role for changes in bargaining within the marriage when divorce becomes a more credible (cheaper) option.

We examine the impact of restructuring active labor market programs for unemployed immigrants in Finland. Exploiting a discontinuity in the phase-in rules of the reform, we find that it increased compliers’ cumulative earnings by 47% over a 10-year follow-up period. We attribute these improvements to a more efficient use of existing resources. The reform did not affect total days in training, but it did modify the content toward training specifically designed for immigrants.

There are persistent differences in self-reported subjective well-being across US metropolitan areas, and residents of declining cities appear less happy than others. Yet some people continue to move to these areas, and newer residents appear to be as unhappy as longer-term residents. While historical data on happiness are limited, the available facts suggest that cities that are now declining were also unhappy in their more prosperous past. These facts support the view that individuals do not maximize happiness alone but include it in the utility function along with other arguments. People may trade off happiness against other competing objectives.

This paper analyzes the effects of job displacement on fertility using Finnish longitudinal register data. We focus on couples where one spouse has lost a job due to a plant closure and follow them for several years before and following the job loss. The results show that female job loss decreases fertility. For every 100 displaced females, there are three fewer children born. Male job loss has no impact on fertility despite resulting in a stronger decrease in family income than female job loss. This indicates that the income effect is not the mechanism through which job displacement influences fertility.

Economic theory predicts that agents work harder if they believe in the mission of the organization. We conduct a real-effort experiment with workers whose mission preferences are known, randomly assigning them to organizations with clear missions to create both matches and mismatches. Our estimates suggest that matching is a strong motivator, especially compared to mismatches. Further, we find that performance pay increases effort, though mostly among mismatched workers who substitute pay for matching. Our results suggest the importance of defining a clear mission to an organization and highlight the significance of sorting, screening, and compensation policies.

Using 1979–2012 CPS data for the United States and 1975–2012 NES data for Great Britain, we study wage behavior in both countries, with particular attention to the Great Recession. Real wages are procyclical in both countries, but the procyclicality of real wages varies across recessions, and does so differently between the two countries, in ways that defy simple explanations. We devote particular attention to the hypothesis that downward nominal wage rigidity plays an important role in cyclical employment and unemployment fluctuations. We conclude that downward wage rigidity may be less binding and have lesser allocative consequences than is often supposed.

We provide a direct empirical test of Montgomery’s 1991 notion that firms hire workers through social ties of productive employees as these workers know others with high unobserved productivity. We focus on coworker networks and show that firms recruit workers with better military draft test scores but shorter schooling when hiring previous colleagues of current employees, suggesting that firms use these networks to attract workers with better qualities in hard-to-observe dimensions. Incumbent workers’ abilities predict the incidence, abilities, and wages of linked entrants. These results suggest that firms rely on the ability density of the studied networks when setting entry wages.