Using a sample of U.S. dual‐class companies, we examine how divergence between insider voting and cash flow rights affects managerial extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as this divergence widens, corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside shareholders, CEOs receive higher compensation, managers make shareholder value‐destroying acquisitions more often, and capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder value. These findings support the agency hypothesis that managers with greater excess control rights over cash flow rights are more prone to pursue private benefits at shareholders’ expense, and help explain why firm value is decreasing in insider excess control rights.

We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. We find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement‐period abnormal stock returns. This supports the hypothesis that managers at firms protected by more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate control and thus are more likely to indulge in empire‐building acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. We also find that acquirers operating in more competitive industries or separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board experience higher abnormal announcement returns.

Technical analysis, also known as “charting,” has been a part of financial practice for many decades, but this discipline has not received the same level of academic scrutiny and acceptance as more traditional approaches such as fundamental analysis. One of the main obstacles is the highly subjective nature of technical analysis—the presence of geometric shapes in historical price charts is often in the eyes of the beholder. In this paper, we propose a systematic and automatic approach to technical pattern recognition using nonparametric kernel regression, and we apply this method to a large number of U.S. stocks from 1962 to 1996 to evaluate the effectiveness of technical analysis. By comparing the unconditional empirical distribution of daily stock returns to the conditional distribution—conditioned on specific technical indicators such as head‐and‐shoulders or double bottoms—we find that over the 31‐year sample period, several technical indicators do provide incremental information and may have some practical value.

We examine how audit firms changed their policies regarding audit partner performance measurement, career development, and compensation during a period of heightened public scrutiny of audit quality (2007 to 2017). We theorize how implementing policy changes requires a delicate transition in the organizational design and internal processes of the firms and may not effectively translate into their day-to-day practices. Our access to proprietary performance management policies and individual partner performance and compensation data from the eight largest Dutch audit firms allows us to gain an in-depth understanding of the evolution of performance management for audit partners. We find that most of the policy changes have real consequences. For example, audit quality becomes more consequential to career development, whereas profit sharing becomes better linked to quality and long-term performance. We conclude that audit firms appear effectively responsive to public scrutiny, increasingly aligning partner incentives with societal expectations of audit quality.

Economic incentives are fundamental for understanding auditor behavior. In this paper, we investigate the association between the extent of partners' fee-based compensation, partners' observable net wealth, and audit quality. Using a sample of Belgian Big 4 audit firms and their predominantly private clients, our results suggest a negative association between audit quality and partner fee-based compensation, and a positive association between audit quality and partner observable net wealth. Moreover, our results show that the latter association is most significant when a partner is carrying a lot of debt, which indicates that a partner's financial situation may affect audit quality. The extent of fee-based incentives also varies among partners of the same audit firm. Furthermore, partner and client characteristics differ based on the extent of fee-based compensation. Our findings should be of interest to regulators and audit firms, as they suggest that audit partners' economic incentives significantly affect audit quality. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

There are striking differences in inequality and redistribution between the United States and Scandinavia. To study whether there are corresponding differences in social preferences, we conducted a large-scale international social preference experiment where Americans and Norwegians make distributive choices in identical environments. Combining the infrastructure of an international online labor market and that of a leading international data collection agency, we show that Americans and Norwegians differ significantly in fairness views, but not in the importance assigned to efficiency. We also provide causal evidence suggesting that fairness considerations are more fundamental for inequality acceptance than efficiency considerations.

We propose a dynamic equilibrium model of asset prices and trading volume when agents face fixed transactions costs. We show that even small fixed costs can give rise to large "no‐trade" regions for each agent's optimal trading policy. The inability to trade more frequently reduces the agents' asset demand and in equilibrium gives rise to a significant illiquidity discount in asset prices.

Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society. This paper reports the results of the first experiment, to our knowledge, to study fairness views about risk-taking, specifically whether such views are based chiefly on ex ante opportunities or on ex post outcomes. We find that, even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities, most favor some redistribution ex post. Many participants also make a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices. These findings apply to both stakeholders and impartial spectators.