We survey 561 students from US medical schools shortly after they submit choice rankings over residencies to the National Resident Matching Program. We elicit (i) these choice rankings, (ii) anticipated subjective well-being (SWB) rankings, and (iii) expected features of the residencies (such as prestige). We find substantial differences between choice and anticipated-SWB rankings in the implied trade-offs between residency features. In our data, evaluative SWB measures (life satisfaction and Cantril's Ladder) imply trade-offs closer to choice than does affective happiness (even time-integrated), and as close as do multimeasure SWB indices. We discuss implications for using SWB data in applied work.

Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic prefer ences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination.

Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees by S. Nageeb Ali, Jacob K. Goeree, Navin Kartik and Thomas R. Palfrey. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 181-86 of American Economic Review, May 2008

Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation: employees are “rational cheaters,” who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs. We investigate the “rational cheater model” by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism. A significant fraction of employees behave as the “rational cheater model” predicts. A substantial proportion of employees, however, do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer.

Recent technological advances make it possible to create automated virtual interviewers, called embodied conversational agents (ECAs). We study how an ECA compares to a human interviewer in three experiments. In experiment 1, we show that two theoretically motivated factors—making the ECA facially and vocally similar to the interviewee—result in the ECA performing similarly to or better than human interviewers for six antecedents of disclosure quality. In two additional experiments, we show that employees are, on average, 21 to 32 percent more likely to disclose violating internal controls to an ECA than to a human, even if the human interviewer has significant interviewing experience. These findings contribute to the ECA design literature by showing that similarity-enhancing features of ECAs increase the antecedents of disclosure. The findings also contribute to the accounting literature by demonstrating that ECA technology can increase the scope of interviewing in accounting without reducing interview quality.

We investigate changes in the quality and cost of audit services surrounding PCAOB Rule 3211, which requires disclosure of audit partner names in Form AP. To isolate changes due to Rule 3211 from other confounding factors, we use difference-in-differences analyses with separate control groups, including a group of companies that disclosed partner identities prior to Rule 3211. Our study also incorporates several measures from prior literature to proxy for various dimensions of audit quality. Evidence from the difference-in-differences analyses reveals that any immediate impact of Rule 3211 on audit quality or fees is limited to specific dimensions of audit quality, specific control groups, and/or specific company characteristics. We reach this conclusion after considering alternative research designs and evaluating confidence intervals for statistically insignificant coefficients. We caution that our findings only provide initial evidence and further research is necessary to evaluate other potential impacts of Rule 3211.

We show that financial knowledge is a key determinant of wealth inequality in a stochastic lifecycle model with endogenous financial knowledge accumulation, where financial knowledge enables individuals to better allocate lifetime resources in a world of uncertainty and imperfect insurance. Moreover, because of how the U.S. social insurance system works, better-educated individuals have most to gain from investing in financial knowledge. Our parsimonious specification generates substantial wealth inequality relative to a one-asset saving model and one where returns on wealth depend on portfolio composition alone. We estimate that 30-40 percent of retirement wealth inequality is accounted for by financial knowledge.

Pathways to Education is a comprehensive support program developed to improve academic outcomes of high school students from very poor social-economic backgrounds. The program includes proactive mentoring, daily tutoring, and group activities, combined with intermediate and long-term incentives to reinforce a minimum degree of mandatory participation; it began in 2001 for entering grade 9 students living in Regent Park, the largest public housing project in Toronto. It expanded in 2007 to include two additional Toronto projects. Comparing students from other housing projects before and after the introduction of the program, high school graduation and postsecondary enrollment rates rose dramatically for Pathways-eligible students, in some cases by more than 50 percent.